University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
12-1-2008

Toward a Unified Theory of Access to Local Telephone Systems
Daniel F. Spulber
Northwestern University

Christopher S. Yoo
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics
Commons, Communications Law Commons, Communication Technology and New Media Commons, Law
and Economics Commons, Science and Technology Law Commons, Science and Technology Policy
Commons, Science and Technology Studies Commons, and the Technology and Innovation Commons

Repository Citation
Spulber, Daniel F. and Yoo, Christopher S., "Toward a Unified Theory of Access to Local Telephone
Systems" (2008). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 270.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/270

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

Toward a Unified Theory of Access to
Local Telephone Networks
Daniel F. Spulber*
Christopher S. Yoo**
I.
II.

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 44
THE HISTORY OF THE REGULATION OF LOCAL TELEPHONY ..... 46
A. Early State and Federal Regulation .................................. 46
B. The Emergence of Competition in Complementary
Services.............................................................................. 48
C. The Emergence of Competition in Local Telephony ......... 51
D. The Telecommunications Act of 1996................................ 53
III. THE RATIONALES FOR REGULATING LOCAL TELEPHONE
NETWORKS ................................................................................. 57
A. Natural Monopoly ............................................................. 58
B. Network Economic Effects................................................. 61
C. Vertical Exclusion ............................................................. 65
D. Ruinous/Managed Competition ......................................... 67

* Elinor Hobbs Distinguished Professor of International Business, Kellogg School of
Management, and Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law.
** Professor of Law and Communication and Founding Director of the Center for
Technology, Innovation, and Competition, University of Pennsylvania. This Article was
presented at a conference entitled “The Breakup of AT&T: A Twenty-Five Year
Retrospective,” which was held at the University of Pennsylvania Law School on April 18–
19, 2008. It will form the basis for Chapter 8 of our forthcoming book: DANIEL F. SPULBER
& CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, NETWORKS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS: ECONOMICS AND LAW,
(forthcoming 2009).

43

44

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61

IV. THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF ACCESS TO LOCAL TELEPHONE
NETWORKS ................................................................................. 77
A. Retail Access...................................................................... 82
B. Wholesale Access............................................................... 87
C. Interconnection Access...................................................... 91
D. Platform Access ............................................................... 102
E. Unbundled Access ........................................................... 108
F. Regulatory Arbitrage....................................................... 113
V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 116

I. INTRODUCTION
The breakup of AT&T represents perhaps the most dramatic landmark
of a fundamental shift in U.S. telecommunications policy. 1 Until the 1960s,
policymakers generally regarded the entire telephone network as being
inherently monopolistic. 2 Over time, technological developments made
competition possible in complementary products and services offered
through the local telephone network, such as the telephone equipment
located in residences and business offices (known as “customer premises
equipment” or “CPE”), 3 long-distance service, and the new set of services
that combined computing power with transmission to provide innovative
new services that went far beyond traditional voice communications
(originally called “enhanced services” and later called “information
services”). The order mandating the breakup of AT&T, commonly known
as the Modification of Final Judgment (MFJ), attempted to promote
competition in those services by mandating that the newly created Bell
Operating Companies provide rival providers with equal access to their
local telephone networks. 4
The MFJ only provided for access to providers of complementary
services. It did not envision direct competition in the local telephone

1. See United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d mem. sub
nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). Some commentators have observed
that regulators had already begun to impose many of the access requirements imposed by
the decision long before the federal government brought its antitrust suit against AT&T.
See, e.g., Glen O. Robinson, The Titanic Remembered: AT&T and the Changing World of
Telecommunications, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 517 (1988) (book review). The decision
nonetheless remains the most salient example of this fundamental change in regulatory
approach.
2. See, e.g., GERALD R. FAULHABER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN TURMOIL 107 (1987);
PETER W. HUBER, MICHAEL K. KELLOGG, & JOHN THORNE, FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
LAW § 2.1.1 (2d ed. 1999).
3. This is in contrast to “telecommunications equipment,” which refers to the wires
and switches located outside end-users’ premises that connected those premises together.
4. United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. at 161-62.
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network. 5 Technology would soon transform that portion of the network, as
new fiber-optic and wireless-based technologies allowed competition in
local telephone service to emerge as well. As a result, Congress enacted the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 6 (1996 Act) and included in it a range of
access requirements that went far beyond those required by the MFJ. 7 The
FCC implemented these new requirements through a regime known as
Total Element Long Run Incremental Cost (TELRIC), which based access
prices on the long-run, forward-looking cost of elements to which the
requesting company sought access. 8
This approach taken by Congress and the FCC suffers from several
conceptual shortcomings. It overlooks the fact that the emergence of
competition undermines many of the basic rationales for regulation. In
addition, a cost-based approach to access pricing, in effect, treats each
network element as if it existed in a vacuum. In so doing, it fails to capture
the interactions between different network components that allow networks
to compensate for limitations in capacity and unexpected changes in
network flows by routing traffic along different pathways. It is quality that
causes networks to behave as complex systems in ways that can be
discontinuous and quite unpredictable. Finally, using the same
methodology to implement many of the access requirements currently
embodied in U.S. telecommunications policy in effect treats them as if they
were conceptually the same. The lack of an overarching theory of network
design ignores the fact that different forms of access have different
implications for network configuration, capacity, reliability, and cost.
This Article seeks to rectify these shortcomings. Part II describes the
early state and federal efforts to regulate local telephone networks and
traces the emergence of competition and the ways in which the regulatory
regime adapted in response. Part III reviews the basic rationales for
regulating local telephone networks and critiques their continued
applicability. Part IV analyzes access through an approach we have
5. See Verizon Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 475-76 (2001) (noting that at the
time of the breakup of AT&T, local telephone service was “thought to be the root of natural
monopoly in the telecommunications industry”); United States v. W. Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp.
525, 537-38 (D.D.C. 1987), aff’d, 894 F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (concluding that local
telephone service “is characterized by very substantial economies of scale and scope” and
that “[t]he exchange monopoly of the Regional Companies has continued because it is a
natural monopoly”); STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 291 (1982) (“Local
telephone service seems to be generally accepted as a natural monopoly.”); 2 ALFRED E.
KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 127 (1971) (“That
the provision of local telephone service is a natural monopoly is generally conceded.”).
6. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. (2000)).
7. See infra notes 49-61 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
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developed based on the branch of mathematics known as graph theory that
captures the interactions between network components that are one of the
most distinctive qualities of networks. 9 In so doing, we apply a five-part
system that we have developed for classifying different forms of access 10 to
gain insight into the problems and distortions caused by the existing
regulatory regime.

II. THE HISTORY OF THE REGULATION OF LOCAL TELEPHONY
A.

Early State and Federal Regulation

Under the system of federalism enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, the
authority of the federal government is limited to interstate commercial
activities. The regulation of intrastate telephone rates fell within the
jurisdiction of the states. 11 Although early legislation in five states had
authorized some degree of regulation over local telephone companies, state
regulation of local telephone service did not begin in earnest until 1907
when states began authorizing their public utility commissions to oversee
the reasonableness of local telephone rates. By 1921, all but three states
had instituted some form of regulation of local telephone rates. 12
Federal regulation of interstate telephone service began in 1910 with
the enactment of the Mann-Elkins Act, 13 which declared interstate
telephone and telegraph companies to be common carriers subject to the
duty to provide service upon any reasonable request at “just and reasonable

9. See Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, On the Regulation of Networks as
Complex Systems: A Graph Theory Approach, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1687, 1693-1707 (2005).
10. See Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Network Regulation: The Many Faces
of Access, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 635 (2005).
11. See, e.g., Smith v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S. 133, 148-49 (1930). Such a vision of
dual federalism can be hard to maintain with respect to network industries such as
telephony, in which the same capital assets are used for both intrastate and interstate service.
With respect to other network industries, such as the railroads, the Supreme Court has
acknowledged that intrastate and interstate rates “are so related that the government of the
one involves the control of the other” and has recognized that the federal government cannot
create a coherent regulatory system without authority over both. Houston & Tex. Ry. v.
United States (Shreveport Rate Case), 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914); accord Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (recognizing that purely intrastate activities can have a tangential
impact on interstate commerce sufficient to bring those activities within federal
jurisdiction). This reasoning has not been extended to telephony prior to 1996. See, e.g., La.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355 (1986); Smith, 282 U.S. at 148-49.
12. H.R. REP. NO. 67-109, at 3 (1921); Consolidation of Competing Telephone
Companies: Joint Hearings on S. 1313 Before the Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 67th
Cong. 4, 5 (1921) (statement of F.B. MacKinnon, President, U.S. Indep. Tel. Ass’n); J.
WARREN STEHMAN, THE FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH
COMPANY 164-67 (Augustus M. Kelley 1967) (1925).
13. Mann-Elkins Act, Pub. L. No. 61-218, ch. 309, §§ 7, 12, 36 Stat. 539, 544-46, 551
(1910).
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rates.” 14 The Act also gave the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) the
power to overturn rates that it found to be “unjust or unreasonable or
unjustly discriminatory or unduly preferential or prejudicial,” 15 but it did
not give the ICC the authority to require the filing of tariffs or mandate
interconnection ex ante, which had the effect of limiting it to ex post
review of rates. 16 In addition, during this period the ICC focused its
attention primarily on the railroads. As a result, the ICC did little to
exercise the scant regulatory jurisdiction over telephone service that it did
possess, undertaking only four telephone rate cases during the twenty-four
years during which it had jurisdiction over the telephone industry. 17
Congress addressed many of the deficiencies of the Mann-Elkins Act
when enacting the Communications Act of 1934.18 In addition to giving the
newly created FCC the authority to ensure that interstate telephone rates
were just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory, the Act also addressed the
ICC’s lack of authority to require tariffs by requiring all interstate carriers
to file schedules of charges. 19 At the same time, the Act preserved the
preexisting division between federal and state authority by including
language providing that “nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply
or to give the Commission jurisdiction with respect to . . . charges,
classifications, practices, services, facilities, or regulations for or in
connection with intrastate communication service . . . of any carrier.” 20 The
Act also gave the FCC the authority to oversee what became known as the
“separations” process, through which the agency would determine what

14. Id. at ch. 309, § 7, 36 Stat. at 545.
15. Id. at ch. 309 § 12, 36 Stat. at 551.
16. Id. at § 7, 12. See also, W. Union Tel. Co. v. Esteve Bros., 256 U.S. 566, 573
(1921); Unrepeated Message Case, 44 I.C.C. 670, 673-74 (1917).
17. Whittaker, 59 I.C.C. 286 (1920); Commercial Cable Co., 45 I.C.C. 33 (1917);
Malone, 40 I.C.C. 185 (1916); W. N. White & Co., 33 I.C.C. 500 (1915). See generally
FCC: Hearings on H.R. 8301 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 73d Cong. 69 (1934) [hereinafter 1934 House Hearings] (statement of Paul
Walker) (observing that “it is known to everyone that the Interstate Commerce Commission
has never found it practical to do anything toward the regulation of telephone rates”),
reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934, at 343, 415
(Max D. Paglin ed., 1989); I.L. SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION: A
STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE part 2, 110 (1931) (observing that “[i]n
practice, . . . there has been no extensive exercise of these broad powers” over interstate
communications by the ICC); Glen O. Robinson, Title I: The Federal Communications Act:
An Essay on Origins and Regulatory Purpose, in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra at 7 (noting
“a general consensus that the ICC did not aggressively implement its new mandate”).
18. Communication Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, chap. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (current
version at 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq (2000)).
19. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201(b), 202(a), 203.
20. Id. §152(b).
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proportion of the costs of capital equipment used for both local and long
distance would be allocated to each service. 21

B.

The Emergence of Competition in Complementary Services

From the time of the enactment of the 1934 Act until the mid-1960s,
regulators and the Bell System entered into a symbiotic relationship. The
regulatory authorities condoned the Bell System’s monopolization of all
aspects of the telephone network. Monopoly control allowed regulators to
authorize charging above cost for certain services and to use the excess
returns to cross-subsidize other services that were more popular with
regulatory constituencies. For example, the FCC used its control over the
separations process to allocate to long-distance rates an ever-increasing
proportion of the costs of the capital equipment used to provide both local
and long-distance service—such as CPE, the wires connecting individual
customers’ premises to central offices (commonly known as “local loops”),
and the switching equipment located in central offices. 22 The higher longdistance charges were thus used to keep monthly charges for local
telephone service low. Similarly, state regulatory authorities used higher
charges on business users to cross-subsidize the rates paid by residential
users. Finally, regulatory authorities used a system known as “rate
averaging” to mandate that all telephone subscribers in the state pay the
same rates for service. The effect was to require lower-cost urban users to
cross-subsidize the service for higher-cost rural users. The Bell System,
which by this time had established a pattern of cooperating with regulatory
authorities, acceded. So long as the resulting rates protected its aggregate
rate of return, it had little concern over the allocation of that revenue across
different customers and services. 23
Over time, outside forces began to undercut this cozy arrangement.
First, after a long period of rate decreases during the 1940s and 1950s, the
Bell System began to seek increases in long-distance rates. Complaints
from members of Congress and the General Services Administration
prompted the FCC to initiate its first systematic analysis of the Bell
System’s costs, which revealed wide disparities in rates of return across
seven different classes of interstate service. As a result, the FCC abandoned
its system of “continuing surveillance,” in which long-distance rates were
established through informal negotiations between AT&T and the FCC, in

21. Id. § 221(c).
22. PETER TEMIN, THE FALL OF THE BELL SYSTEM 25-27 (1987).
23. See David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, Cross-Subsidies in Telecommunications:
Roadblocks on the Road to More Intelligent Telephone Pricing, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 119,
131, 142-46 (1994); Howard A. Shelanski, Adjusting Regulation to Competition: Toward a
New Model for U.S. Telecommunications Policy, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 55, 59-60 (2007).
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favor of a more formal regulatory regime based on cost-of-service
ratemaking. 24
In addition, competition began to emerge from providers of
complementary services. For example, producers of CPE began to seek
access to the Bell System’s local telephone networks. “Foreign
attachments” provisions contained in the Bell System’s tariffs prohibited
the interconnection of any CPE not manufactured by the Bell System’s
manufacturing subsidiary, Western Electric. After some prodding by the
courts, 25 the FCC issued its landmark Carterfone decision, 26 which
eventually led to the adoption of the Part 68 rules requiring the Bell System
to open its network to any CPE that met specified requirements. 27
The emergence of microwave as a means of transmission allowed
competition to emerge in long distance as well. A new company called
Microwave Communications, Inc. (later better known as MCI) realized that
it could expand its private line services—which were designed to serve
companies with multiple offices in distant locations, both by connecting
those offices together and by providing connections to the local telephone
networks surrounding each location—to provide long-distance service as
well. Again, after some prodding by the courts, 28 the FCC acceded and
allowed competition in long-distance service to emerge. 29
In addition, a new set of services, originally called “enhanced
services” and later called “information services,” began to emerge, which
combined computing power with transmission to provide innovative new
services that went far beyond traditional voice communications. 30 Some of
24. Charges for Interstate & Foreign Comm., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2
F.C.C.2d 871, 871-72 paras. 1-2 (1965).
25. See Hush-a-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1956)
(recognizing every subscriber’s right “to use his telephone in ways which are privately
beneficial without being publicly detrimental”).
26. Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, Decision, 13
F.C.C.2d 420, 13 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 597 (1968).
27. Proposals for New or Revised Classes of Interstate & Foreign Message Toll Tel.
Ser. (MTS) & Wide Area Tel. Serv. (WATS), First Report and Order, 56 F.C.C.2d 593
(1975) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 68 (2008)).
28. See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977); MCI Telecomm.
Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
29. MTS and WATS Market Structure, Report and Third Supplemental Notice of
Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking, 81 F.C.C.2d 177, 48 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 67 (1980).
30. The FCC defined enhanced services as “services, offered over common carrier
transmission facilities used in interstate communications, which employ computer
processing applications that act on the format, content, code, protocol or similar aspects of
the subscriber’s transmitted information; provide the subscriber additional, different, or
restructured information; or involve subscriber interaction with stored information.”
Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regs. (Second Computer Inquiry),
Order, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 498 paras. 233-60 (1980) [hereinafter Computer Inquiry II]
(codified at 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a) (2008)), aff’d sub nom. Computer & Comm. Indus. Ass’n
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these services were dial-up services, the predecessors to the modern
Internet, which used analog modems to make it possible for the first time to
connect computers to the network. Other services harnessed computing
power in the network itself, typically in the newly digitized switches, to
provide new services, such as voicemail, call waiting, and caller ID.
Because these functions were most efficiently provided through the switch
itself, they became known as “vertical switching services.”
Policymakers soon became concerned that the incumbent local
telephone companies would be able to use their monopoly control over the
local telephone network to favor their own proprietary enhanced and
information service offerings. As a result, the FCC initiated its first and
second Computer Inquiries, 31 which required that any leading local
telephone companies wishing to provide data processing or enhanced
services do so through a separate corporate subsidiary and required that
those companies serve all enhanced service providers on a
nondiscriminatory basis.
The FCC later concluded in Computer Inquiry III, 32 that the costs of
the separate subsidiary requirement outweighed the benefits and that
nonstructural safeguards could protect against anticompetitive activity just
as effectively. Consequently, it allowed local telephone companies to avoid
the separate subsidiary requirement so long as they adhered to a two-phase
system of alternative regulatory requirements. The first phase was in
essence a nondiscriminatory access mandate known as comparably
efficient interconnection (CEI), which required local telephone providers to
provide unaffiliated enhanced service providers with access to the same
facilities on the same terms and conditions provided to their own
proprietary enhanced and information service offerings. 33 The second
v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The FCC later ruled that the term “enhanced
services” should be interpreted as extending to the same functions as the term “information
services” established by the MFJ and codified by the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Secs. 271 & 272 of the Comm. Act of
1934, as amended, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11
F.C.C.R. 21905, 21955-56 para. 102 (1996). See generally Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher
S. Yoo, Access to Networks: Economic and Constitutional Connections, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 885, 1007 (2003).
31. Reg. & Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and Comm.
Serv. & Facilities (Computer Inquiry I), Final Decision and Order, 28 F.C.C.2d 267, 270-74
paras. 11-22 (1970), aff’d sub nom. GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973);
Computer Inquiry II, supra note 30, at 475-86 paras. 233-60 (1980).
32. Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Third
Computer Inquiry), Report and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 958, 1002-11 paras. 79-97, 1035-42
paras. 147-66, 1064-66 paras. 214-17 (1986) [hereinafter Computer III Phase I Order], on
reconsideration, 2 F.C.C.R. 3035 (1987), vacated and remanded sub nom. California v.
FCC (California I), 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990).
33. Id. at 1021-25 paras. 117-35.
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phase, known as open network architecture, in essence required unbundled
access to all of the incumbent’s network elements. 34 A series of judicial
challenges prevented the alternative regime created by the Computer
Inquiry III from ever being fully implemented. 35
The consent decree ordering the breakup of AT&T also required the
local telephone companies to provide equal access to all long-distance and
information service providers. 36 This regime was later extended to mandate
equal access to CPE as well. 37 These measures made no attempt to
introduce competition into local telephony. Instead, they conceded that
local telephone service remained a natural monopoly and instead attempted
to foster competition in complementary services. 38

C.

The Emergence of Competition in Local Telephony

Eventually, competition began to emerge, not just in services that
were complementary to local telephony, but also with respect to local
telephone service itself. The arrival of fiber optics fostered the emergence
of a new type of company known as competitive access providers
(CAPs). 39 CAPs initially focused on offering long-distance bypass services,
which allowed corporate customers to place long-distance telephone calls
without having to access the Bell System’s local telephone facilities. The
eventual expansion of CAP networks to cover the entire core business
districts of major metropolitan areas made it possible for CAPs to begin to
offer local telephone service in direct competition with the incumbents. 40
CAP-provided services possessed certain advantages. CAPs employed
fiber-optic technologies, which allowed them to offer more features and a

34. Id. at 1002-11 paras. 79-97, 1035-42 paras.147-66, 1064-66 paras. 214-17.
35. The Ninth Circuit initially overturned the Computer Inquiry III regime as arbitrary
and capricious on the grounds that the FCC had not adequately justified its decision to rely
on nonstructural safeguards. California I, 905 F.2d at 1230-39. A subsequent attempt to
reinstate the Computer III regime also failed to pass judicial muster. Computer III Remand
Proceedings: Bell Operating Co. Safeguards & Tier 1 Local Exch. Co. Safeguards, Report
and Order, 6 F.C.C.R. 7571, 7578-88 paras. 14-41, 7617-25 paras. 98-109 (1991), vacated
and remanded in part sub nom. California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 1994).
36. United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 195-97 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d mem.
sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
37. See HUBER, KELLOGG & THORNE, supra note 2, § 5.2.1.2.
38. See supra note 5 and accompanying text; Implementation of the Local Competition
Provisions in the Telecomm. Act of 1996, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R.
14171, para. 4 (1996).
39. The discussion that follows is adapted from Spulber & Yoo, Access to Networks,
supra note 30, at 961-63.
40. David J. Teece, Telecommunications in Transition: Unbundling, Reintegration, and
Competition, 1 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 47, 66, 78 (1994-1995) (describing CAP
entry into local telephone service in New York, Chicago, and Grand Rapids).
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cheaper price structure than the incumbents. 41 Moreover, regulators did not
require CAPs to submit tariffs. The more relaxed regulatory environment
allowed CAPs to respond more quickly to changes in technology and
market demand and to customize pricing and terms of service to each
customer’s needs. The untariffed nature of CAP services also allowed them
to evade the system of cross-subsidies embedded in current regulatory
policy.
The emergence of competition in local telephone networks meant that
some calls would originate on one local telephone company’s network and
terminate on another’s. The FCC became concerned that incumbent local
telephone companies would attempt to forestall the emergence of
competition either by refusing to interconnect with CAPs or by only
agreeing to do so on economically unattractive terms. The FCC thus
ordered the incumbent local telephone companies to give CAPs the right to
interconnect with their local telephone networks on the same terms and
conditions that the incumbent provided for their own circuits. In order to
make this interconnection mandate effective, the FCC gave CAPs the right
to place any equipment needed to terminate calls in the incumbent’s central
offices, which the FCC termed “physical collocation.” If the incumbent’s
central office lacked sufficient physical space to accommodate the CAP,
the FCC ordered the incumbent to provide “virtual collocation,” which
allowed the CAP to interconnect with the incumbent’s network through a
location outside of the incumbent’s central office. The price of both
physical and virtual collocation would be governed by price caps. As with
other price cap regimes, initial rates would be based on historical cost. 42
State authorities issued similar orders to facilitate CAP entry into local
telephone service.
The FCC’s collocation rules were struck down on judicial review on
the grounds that they exceeded the FCC’s statutory authority. 43 The
reviewing court reasoned that the right to place equipment on the
incumbent’s property constituted precisely the type of permanent physical
41. Specifically, the use of fiber optics provided dramatic improvements in the amount
of bandwidth available. It also decreased service costs in general and made them much less
distance sensitive. Fiber optics also allowed CAPs to take advantage of the efficiencies
made possible by computer processing, such as improved switching and digital
compression.
42. Expanded Interconnection with Local Tel. Co. Facilities, Report and Order and
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 7369, 7374-75 para. 7 & nn.10-12, 7389-90
para. 39, 7390-91 paras. 41-42, 7392-94 paras. 44-46, 7424-25 para. 120, 7428-29 para.
127, 7476-83 paras. 230-40 (1992) [hereinafter Special Access Order]; Expanded
Interconnection with Local Tel. Co. Facilities, Second Report and Order and Third Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 8 F.C.C.R. 7374, 7391-404 para. 29-31, 7418 para. 75, 7419 para.
79, 7475 para. 144 (1993).
43. Bell Atl. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 24 F.3d 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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occupation that Loretto 44 held to be a per se taking. The principle that
statutes should not be construed so as to create “‘an identifiable class of
cases in which application of a statute will necessarily constitute a taking’”
thus dictated that mandating physical collocation exceeded the FCC’s
statutory authority. 45 The FCC responded to this decision by giving the
incumbent local telephone companies the option of providing virtual
collocation instead of physical collocation. The FCC continued to maintain
that mandatory physical collocation did not constitute a per se taking, but
argued that, regardless of whether that was true, offering virtual collocation
as an option eliminated any such constitutional problems. 46 Before the
courts could address the validity of these revised regulations, the entire
scheme was rendered moot by the enactment of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996. 47

D.

The Telecommunications Act of 1996

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 48 was designed to “open[] all
communications services to competition,” including local telephone
service. 49 Policymakers envisioned that competition in local telephone
markets might emerge through one of three paths. 50 First, an entrant might
simply obtain access to all of the elements needed to provide local
telephone service from the incumbent and resell them. Resale rates would
be based on retail rates less “any marketing, billing, collection, and other
costs that will be avoided” when local telephone services are provided by
another carrier. 51
Second, an entrant might build an entirely new network. Because any
new entrant would need to be able to place calls to and receive calls from
the incumbent local telephone companies’ customers, the 1996 Act requires
that incumbents allow any requesting telecommunications carrier to
44. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
45. Bell Atl. Tel. Co. 24 F.3d at 1445 (quoting United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 128 n.5 (1985)).
46. Expanded Interconnection with Local Tel. Co. Facilities, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 5154, 5163 paras. 22-23 (1994).
47. See Pac. Bell Co. v. FCC, Nos. 94-1547, 94-1548 & 94-1612, 1996 WL 175198
(D.C. Cir. Mar. 22, 1996).
48. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 601(b)(1), 110 Stat. 56,
143 (1996) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 152 note (2000)).
49. H.R. REP. NO. 104-204, pt. 1, at 48-49, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1, 11-13.
The discussion that follows is adapted in part from Spulber & Yoo, Access to Networks,
supra note 30, at 965-70.
50. Verizon Comm. Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 491-92 (2002). See also,
Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecomm. Act of 1996, First
Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 15509 para. 12 (1996) [hereinafter Local
Competition Order].
51. 47 U.S.C. §252(d)(3) (2000). See also id. § 251(c)(4).
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interconnect with their networks at any technically feasible point on terms
that are equal in quality to those that the incumbent provides for its own
circuits and that are “just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.” 52
Third, an entrant may provide some of the elements needed to offer
local telephone service and obtain the rest from the incumbent. To allow
this to occur, Congress required every incumbent local telephone company
to provide all other carriers with access to any of its network elements on
an unbundled basis (called “unbundled network element” or “UNE”
access). This would obviate the need for an entrant to have its entire
network in place at the time it began to offer local service. 53 Such access
must be provided at any technically feasible point under rates, terms, and
conditions that are “just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.” 54 In
determining which network elements would be subject to the unbundled
access requirement, the statute required the FCC to consider whether
“access to such network elements as are proprietary in nature is necessary”
and whether “the failure to provide access to such network elements would
impair the ability of the telecommunications carrier seeking access to
provide the services that it seeks to offer.” 55
The statute requires that the parties first attempt to determine the
prices for interconnection and access to unbundled network elements
through voluntary negotiations, at times aided by mediation by a state
public utility commission. If voluntary negotiations fail, Congress gave
state public utility commissions the power to set rates through binding
arbitration, which would be governed by one of two statutory mandates.
First, arbitrated rates for interconnection and UNE access shall be “based
on the cost . . . of providing the interconnection or network element,”
provided that cost is “determined without reference to a rate-of-return or
other rate-based proceeding.” 56 Second, access rates for terminating traffic
originating on another network shall be governed by “reciprocal
compensation,” which “provide[s] for the mutual and reciprocal recovery
by each carrier of costs associated with the transport and termination on
each carrier’s network facilities of calls that originate on the network
facilities of the other carrier.” 57 Such costs must be determined “on the
basis of a reasonable approximation of the additional costs of terminating
such calls,” although carriers may waive mutual recovery in favor of other

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. § 251(c)(2)(B)-(D).
S. REP. NO. 104-230, at 147 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3).
Id. § 251(d)(2)(A)-(B) (emphasis added).
Id. § 252(d)(1)(A)(i).
Id. § 252(d)(2)(A)(i).
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arrangements, such as bill and keep systems. 58 The result was a wide-scale
federalization of local telephony, including many areas of regulation that
had previously fallen within the jurisdiction of the states. 59
Because both interconnection and access to UNEs almost inevitably
require allowing the requesting carrier to place some of its equipment on
the incumbent local telephone company’s property, the statute requires
incumbents to permit physical collocation so that entrants can establish
physical connections between their equipment and the incumbent’s
network. Specifically, the statute requires incumbents to permit “physical
collocation of equipment necessary for interconnection or access to
unbundled network elements” on “rates, terms, and conditions that are just,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.” 60 If “physical collocation is not
practical for technical reasons or because of space limitations,” the statute
gives incumbents the option of providing virtual collocation instead. 61
As noted earlier, the FCC employed a methodology known as
TELRIC to implement the provisions governing interconnection and UNE
access rates. Under TELRIC, UNE rates are based on the element’s
“economic costs,” which the FCC defined as the incremental costs directly
attributable to the specified element plus a reasonable allocation of the joint
and common costs. 62 TELRIC resolved a longstanding dispute in
regulatory policy 63 by assessing both the incremental and common costs on
a forward-looking basis that focuses on the cost of replacing a particular
network element rather than the amount actually paid for it. TELRIC
eludes the problems caused by the distinction between fixed and variable
costs by measuring incremental costs from a “long run” perspective, which
is defined as a period that is long enough for all of a firm’s costs to become
variable or avoidable. The FCC believed that basing rates on forwardlooking incremental cost represented the best way to replicate, to the
greatest extent possible, the conditions of a competitive market. 64 In
addition, TELRIC further accommodates technological change by requiring
that costs be determined on the basis of the most efficient technology
available and the lowest cost network configuration given the existing
58. Id. § 252(d)(2)(A)(ii).
59. As the Supreme Court noted in Iowa Utilities Board, “[T]he question in these cases
is not whether the Federal Government has taken the regulation of local telecommunications
competition away from the States. With regard to the matters addressed by the 1996 Act, it
unquestionably has.” AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 378 n.6 (1999).
60. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(6).
61. Id.
62. Local Competition Order, supra note 50, 15845 para. 675, 15847 para. 682.
63. See Spulber & Yoo, Access to Networks, supra note 30, at 902-03, 908-10
(describing the longstanding debate over whether regulated rates should be based on
historical or replacement cost).
64. Local Competition Order, supra note 50, at 15813 para. 620, 15846 para. 679.
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location of the incumbent’s current wire centers. 65 The FCC declined to
incorporate an element to reflect the opportunity cost borne by the network
owner. 66 Although the statutory mandate underlying TELRIC applied only
to interconnection and UNE access, the FCC ruled that TELRIC should
also govern physical collocation. 67 In addition, the FCC determined that
TELRIC represented the appropriate interpretation of the “the additional
costs of terminating such calls” that govern reciprocal compensation,
although the statute explicitly reserves the possibility of bill and keep. 68
Initially, the FCC interpreted the “necessary” and “impair”
requirements broadly to encompass essentially all of the elements needed
to provide local telephone service. 69 This allowed entrants to avoid resale
pricing altogether simply by using UNE access to obtain access to the same
network elements, a practice known as the UNE-Platform or UNE-P. Over
time, the FCC began to cut back on the number of elements subject to the
1996 Act’s UNE access requirements. The precipitous drop in the cost of
switching caused by the advent of digital technologies led the FCC to
rethink the extent to which switching should remain subject to UNE access.
In 2003, the FCC removed switches serving large business customers
(called “enterprise market switching”) from the list of elements to which
new entrants could obtain UNE access. 70 At the same time, it continued to
allow UNE access to switches serving residences and small businesses
(called “mass market switching”), not because of high fixed costs, but
rather because of operational problems associated with “hot cuts,” during
which the line serving a particular customer is disconnected from the
65. 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(b)(1) (2008).
66. Local Competition Order, supra note 50, at 15859-60 paras. 708-11.
67. Id. at 15816 para. 629.
68. Id. at 16023 para. 1054 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(2)(A)(ii)); accord 47 C.F.R. §
51.705(a)(1) (2008) (requiring that reciprocal compensation be determined on the basis of
forward-looking economic costs pursuant to the methodology governing pricing for
interconnection and access for unbundled network elements). The FCC allowed for three
alternatives. One option was for state PUCs to adopt a proxy range set by the FCC (at 0.2
and 0.4 cents per minute for termination). Id. at 16024 para. 1055, 16026-28 para. 1060-62.
The Eighth Circuit struck down the use of proxy prices. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 219
F.3d 744, 756-57 (8th Cir. 2000), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Verizon Comm. Inc. v.
FCC, 535 U.S. 467 (2002). This portion of the Eighth Circuit’s decision does not appear to
have been challenged before the Supreme Court.
69. See Local Competition Order, supra note 50, at 15683-714 paras. 360-426; 1571469 paras. 428-528; Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecomm.
Act of 1996, Third Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 3696, 3778-832 paras. 181-299, 3840-90
paras. 318-437 (1999) [hereinafter UNE Remand Order].
70. See Review of the Sec. 251 Unbundled Obligations of Incumbent Local Exch.
Carriers, Report and Order and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 16978, 17237 para. 419, 17238-39 para. 421, 17258-60, paras.
451-53 (2003) [hereinafter Triennial Review Order], modified, 18 F.C.C.R. 19020 (2003),
vacated in part sub nom. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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incumbent’s switch and reattached to the new entrant’s. 71 Both findings
could be rebutted on a case-by-case basis. 72
The D.C. Circuit upheld the FCC’s decision with respect to enterprise
market switching, observing that “[t]here appears to be no suggestion that
mass market switches exhibit declining average costs in the relevant
markets, or even that switches entail large sunk costs” and deployment of
duplicate switches did not appear to be either “uneconomic” or
“wasteful.” 73 The absence of any evidence that denying access to
incumbents’ mass market switches would impair competitors’ ability to
compete led the court to overturn the FCC’s refusal to deregulate mass
market switching. 74 On remand, the FCC harmonized both findings by
ruling that mass market switching was no longer subject to UNE access
requirements, largely because of the wide-scale deployment of competitive
circuit switches and the investment disincentives created by sharing
requirements, a conclusion that was upheld on judicial review. 75

III. THE RATIONALES FOR REGULATING LOCAL TELEPHONE
NETWORKS
The regulation of local telephone networks has traditionally been
based on four primary rationales: the belief that local telephone service is a
natural monopoly, the concern that network economic effects will give
incumbents decisive advantages, the dangers that the incumbent will
engage in vertical exclusion to deny access to providers of complementary
services, and the purported dangers of “ruinous” competition. The impact
of these regulatory efforts—and the challenges that state and federal
regulators have confronted—illustrate the difficulty of attempting to
impose regulation on such a technologically complex and dynamic
industry, as well as how the emergence of competition is undermining each
of these rationales.

71. Id. at 17237-38 para. 419, 17239 para. 422, 17263-64 para. 459, 17265-86 paras.
464-485.
72. Id. at 17237 para. 419, 17238-39 para. 421, 17239-40 para. 424, 17260-63 paras.
454-58, 17264-65 paras. 460-463, 17290-312 paras. 493-524.
73. U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 359 F.3d at 569, 572-73.
74. Id. at 586-87.
75. See Unbundled Access to Network Elements, Order on Remand, 20 F.C.C.R. 2533,
2641-61 paras. 199-228 (2005) [hereinafter Triennial Review Remand Order], pet. for
review denied sub nom. Covad Comm. Co. v. FCC, 450 F.3d 528, 546-49 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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Natural Monopoly

One of the bedrock assumptions of telecommunications policy is that
local telephone networks are natural monopolies. 76 A natural monopoly
exists when a market is subadditive; this occurs when one firm can serve
the entire market demand at a lower cost than could two or more firms. A
sufficient condition for subadditivity exists if the scale economies are so
large that the average cost curve declines over the entire industry output.
One example occurs when the production technology requires the incurring
of large, up-front fixed costs. The fact that average cost is always declining
permits producers with larger volumes to underprice their competitors,
which in turn allows them to capture a still larger share of the market. The
growing disparity in sales volume causes the price disparity to widen still
further until all other producers are driven from the market. When that is
the case, even markets that begin as competitive will eventually come to be
dominated by a single player.
The large fixed cost investments associated with establishing
telephone switches and the network of wires needed to transmit telephone
calls has led many observers to regard local telephone networks as natural
monopolies. Natural monopoly represented one of the central justifications
for early regulatory efforts in the 1920s 77 as well as the regulatory scheme
created by the Communications Act of 1934. 78 Even after the FCC began to
use regulation and the breakup of AT&T to promote competition in
services complementary to local telephony, such as CPE, long distance, and
information services, policymakers continued to believe that local
telephone networks remained natural monopolies—largely by virtue of the
high fixed costs associated with laying the wires needed to make local
distribution possible. 79 It was not until the enactment of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 that policymakers began attempting to
promote local competition in earnest.
A close analysis of the cost structure associated with the early
telephone industry undercuts claims that local telephone service constituted
a natural monopoly during that time. The primary source of diseconomies

76. The following discussion of the economics of natural monopoly draws on Spulber
& Yoo, Access to Networks, supra note 30, at 917; and Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulating
Telecommunications, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 25, 31-32 (1995).
77. S. REP. NO. 67-75, at 1 (1921).
78. STUDY OF COMMUNICATIONS BY AN INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 11-2 (Comm. Print 1934), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934, supra note 17, at 101, 115-16; Hearings on S. 2910 Before
the Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 73d Cong. 100 (1934), reprinted in A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934, supra note 17, at 119, 222.
79. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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of scale was switching. 80 Initially, telephone connections were made
manually by an operator at a switchboard. Switching was relatively simple
so long as the number of subscribers connected to any particular exchange
was relatively small. Increases in the number of subscribers eventually
required the installation of additional switchboards interconnected through
trunk lines, which in turn caused switching to become more complex. For
example, in an exchange with two switchboards, one-half of all calls would
arrive on one switchboard and terminate on the other, which would require
the participation of two operators to set up and take down each call. Calls
to exchanges with three and four switchboards would require multiple
operators for two-thirds and three-quarters of all calls respectively. In
addition, the presence of multiple switchboards increased the
organizational problem considerably. Operators had to keep track of the
board on which each customer resided and of which trunk lines were open
at any particular time. The problem becomes all the more difficult after one
considers that the number of connections increases quadratically with the
number of users. 81 Thus, increases in the subscriber base drastically
increase both the cost of service and the complexity of the organizational
problem.
The diseconomies of scale in switching became a major problem for
the Bell System, which had to seek rate increases as its subscriber base
grew. It also became a trap for the independents, which often entered based
on the promise of lower rates, only to find that their very success in
attracting business away from the Bell System rendered those rates
unsustainable. 82 The nonscalability of switching technology thus undercuts
claims that the telephone system was a natural monopoly during the
industry’s early years. Although the deployment of mechanical switches
eventually caused switching to become less important as a source of
diseconomies of scale, the Bell System did not begin wide-scale
deployment of mechanical switches until 1919. 83
80. For an excellent discussion of the diseconomies of scale in switching, see Milton
Mueller, The Switchboard Problem: Scale, Signaling, and Organization in Manual
Telephone Swathing, 1877-1897, 30 TECH. & CULTURE 534 (1989).
81. Spulber & Yoo, Graph Theory Approach, supra note 9, at 1696; Christopher S.
Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847, 1883-84
(2006).
82. MILTON L. MUELLER, JR., UNIVERSAL SERVICE 36, 65-66 (1997); David F, Weiman
& Richard C. Levin, Preying for Monopoly? The Case of Southern Bell Telephone
Company, 1894-1912, 102 J. POL. ECON. 103, 104 (1994).
83. See generally H.R. Doc. No. 76-340, at 261 (1939); BELL TELEPHONE
LABORATORIES, A HISTORY OF ENGINEERING AND SCIENCE IN THE BELL SYSTEM: THE EARLY
YEARS (1875-1925) 552-53, 611-12 (1975); ROBERT J. CHAPUIS, 100 YEARS OF TELEPHONE
SWITCHING (1878-1978), PART I: MANUAL AND ELECTROMECHANICAL SWITCHING (18781960S), 249 (1982); Joan Nix & David Gabel, The Introduction of Automatic Switching into
the Bell System: Market Versus Institutional Influences, 30 J. ECON. ISSUES 737, 738 (1996).
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Disputes over the extent to which the local telephone network
constituted a natural monopoly persisted well into more recent times.
Leading treatises on regulated industries acknowledge the persistence of
disputes over whether the telephone industry was characterized by
increasing or decreasing average costs. 84 A vibrant empirical literature
emerged debating whether local telephone networks were natural
monopolies. Some studies concluded that local telephone service was
subadditive, 85 while other studies drew the opposite conclusion. 86
Subsequent technological developments have largely rendered these
disputes moot. As noted earlier, the advent of digital technologies has
caused a precipitous drop in the cost of switching, which in turn has led the
FCC to remove switching from the list of elements subject to UNE
access. 87 Competition has even begun to emerge with respect to the local
loop, the portion of the local telephone network thought most likely to
retain natural monopoly characteristics. State public utility commissions
have begun to deregulate local service to large business customers, 88
although the FCC continues to subject high capacity loops (except for dark
fiber) to UNE access obligations. 89 Wireless has also emerged as a vibrant
competitor in local telephone service in the residential and small business
markets, with the number of wireless subscribers surpassing the number of
wireline subscribers since 2004 90 and with thirty million American adults
84. See, e.g., JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 16-17 (1961).
85. See A. Charnes, W.W. Cooper & T. Sueyoshi, A Goal Programming/Constrained
Regression Review of the Bell System Breakup, 34 MGMT. SCI. 1 (1988); Lars-Hendrik
Röller, Proper Quadratic Cost Functions with an Application to the Bell System, 72 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 202 (1990); Lars-Hendrik Röller, Modeling Cost Structure: The Bell System
Revisited, 22 APPLIED ECON. 1161 (1990); Wesley W. Wilson & Yimin Zhou,
Telecommunications Deregulation and Subadditive Costs: Are Local Telephone Monopolies
Natural?, 19 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 909 (2001). See also David Gabel & D. Mark Kennet,
Economies of Scope in the Local Telephone Exchange Market, 6 J. REG. ECON. 381 (1994);
F. Gasmi, J.J. Laffont & W.W. Sharkey, The Natural Monopoly Test Reconsidered: An
Engineering Process-Based Approach to Empirical Analysis in Telecommunications, 20
INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 435 (2002).
86. See David S. Evans & James J. Heckman, Multiproduct Cost Function Estimates
and Natural Monopoly Tests for the Bell System, in BREAKING UP BELL 127 (David S. Evans
ed., 1983); David S. Evans & James J. Heckman, A Test for Subadditivity of the Cost
Function with an Application to the Bell System, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 615 (1984); Richard T.
Shin & John S. Ying, Unnatural Monopolies in Local Telephone, 23 RAND J. ECON. 171
(1992); Sanford V. Berg & John Tschirhart, A Market Test for Natural Monopoly in the
Local Exchange, 8 J. REG. ECON. 103 (1995).
87. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
88. See Timothy J. Tardiff, Changes in Industry Structure and Technological
Convergence: Implications for Competition Policy and Regulation in Telecommunications,
4 INT’L ECON. & ECON. POL’Y 109 (2007).
89. See Triennial Review Remand Order, supra note 70, at 2614-41 paras. 146-98.
90. FCC INDUSTRY ANALYSIS TECHNOLOGY DIVISION, WIRELINE COMPETITION BUREAU,
LOCAL TELEPHONE COMPETITION: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2004, at 1, 3, 5 tbl.1, 17
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(roughly fourteen percent) relying solely on their wireless phone for
service. 91 Competition from Voice-over-Internet Protocol (VoIP) provided
via coaxial cable is starting to emerge with respect to residential and small
business customers as well. Although state and federal regulators have
exhibited some reluctance to deregulate local telephone service on the basis
of intermodal competition, 92 it seems only a matter of time before one can
plausibly continue to maintain that the local loop still exhibits natural
monopoly characteristics.

B.

Network Economic Effects

Policymakers have also invoked network economic effects as a
justification for wide-scale regulation of local telephone service. Network
economic effects exist when the value of a particular good is determined in
large part by the number of other people connected to the same network. 93
The concern is that network economic effects will create demand-side
economies of scale that will cause the largest networks to be worth the
most to consumers. In this way, network economic effects can create what
is sometimes called “excess inertia” that allows incumbents to maintain
their dominance long after the arrival of a more efficient competitor or
technology. 94
The leaders of the Bell System clearly understood the importance of
network economic effects. As it noted in its 1908 Annual Report, “[a]
telephone—without a connection at the other end of the line—is . . . one of
the most useless things in the world. Its value depends on the connection
with the other telephone—and increases with the number of
connections.” 95 Indeed, the Bell System attempted to use network
economic effects to leverage its initial dominance by refusing to
interconnect with independent telephone systems during the early years of
competition. Some scholars have suggested network economic effects
played a key role in the Bell System’s return to dominance after 1907,

tbl.13 (July 2005), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/
FCC-State_Link/IAD/lcom0705.pdf
91. Alex Mindlin, Cellphone-Only Homes Hit a Milestone, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2007,
at C3.
92. See, e.g., Triennial Review Order, supra note 70, at 17252 para. 445; Application of
Qwest Corp. for Deregulation of Basic Local Exch. Rates, Order No. 29360, 2003 WL
22417269 (Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm’n Oct. 20, 2003).
93. For more complete analyses of network economic effects, see Christopher S. Yoo,
Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 171,
269-85 (2002); Spulber & Yoo, Access to Networks, supra note 30, at 921-33.
94. Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation,
Product Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 940, 942 (1986).
95. AT&T, 1908 ANNUAL REPORT 21 (1909); see also BONBRIGHT, supra note 84, at 17.
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when its market share dipped below fifty percent. 96 Some argue that the
Bell System reasserted its dominant position by refusing to interconnect
with the independents’ local telephone networks. According to this
argument, the network economic effects from connecting with other local
customers created demand-side scale economies that gave Bell a decisive
advantage. 97 Others focus on the network economic effects provided by
Bell System’s refusal to allow the independents to interconnect with its
long-distance network. Under this argument, key long-distance patents,
such as the Pupin coil, enabled the Bell System to provide superior longdistance service, which in turn increased the value of the network by
increasing the number of customers any subscriber could reach through the
network. These network economic effects, according to this variant of the
argument, gave the Bell System a decisive competitive advantage which it
could use to drive out the independents simply by refusing to allow them to
interconnect with its long-distance network. 98
A close analysis of the history of the era reveals that the refusal to
interconnect likely did not play a substantial role in allowing the Bell
System to reassert its dominance. The Bell System’s long-distance network
was unlikely to serve as a source of demand-side economies of scale.
During this period, long distance represented only a tiny fraction of the
overall demand for telephone service. 99 Indeed, contemporary observers
acknowledged that its ability to provide superior long-haul, long-distance
service was “of little commercial or social importance.” 100 Short-haul longdistance service could be provided simply by interconnecting adjacent
exchanges. Again, the Bell System held no competitive advantage for this
type of traffic, because AT&T and the independents were employing the
same technology. 101 Assuming that long distance was an important source
of network economic effects, as noted earlier, the independent telephone
companies had captured more than half of the market by 1907. They were

96. See KENNETH LIPARTITO, THE BELL SYSTEM AND REGIONAL BUSINESS: THE
TELEPHONE IN THE SOUTH, 1877-1920, at 250 n.4 (1989) (“The notion that Bell’s refusal to
interconnect was a potent competitive weapon is an article of faith in telephone literature.”).
97. See Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28 CONN.
L. REV. 1041, 1046 n.19 (1996); Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust
Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 8 (2001).
98. JOHN BROOKS, TELEPHONE: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 114 (1975); GERALD W.
BROCK, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY: THE DYNAMICS OF MARKET STRUCTURE 11719 (1981); FAULHABER, supra note 2, at 3-5; John V. Langdale, The Growth of LongDistance Telephony in the Bell System: 1875-1907, 4 J. HIST. GEOGRAPHY 145, 155 (1978).
99. See 2 U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF
THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 783 (1975) (reporting that toll calling
represented less than 2.5% of all calls in 1907 and never exceeded 4.5% prior to 1934).
100. MUELLER, supra note 82, at 73.
101. See id., at 72-76, 90-91, 141, 144.
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thus in a position to neutralize any attempt by the Bell System to use
network economic effects to leverage its market size simply by banding
together to form a network equal in size to AT&T’s. 102
The Bell System’s local telephone networks were also unlikely to
have served as the source of significant network economic effects. As we
noted in our previous work, network economic effects are unlikely to be a
source of anticompetitive problems in markets undergoing rapid growth,
because the presence of a large number of uncommitted customers would
offset whatever advantages the incumbent enjoyed by virtue of its existing
customer base. 103 A new entrant could achieve a network of the same or
greater size than that of the incumbent simply by pursuing new customers.
This appears to be precisely what happened in the early telephone
industry. The Bell System had patterned its initial business strategy on
Western Union’s, which primarily provided long-distance communications
to business customers located in large commercial centers. As a result, the
Bell System largely ignored small cities, rural areas, and residential areas,
not even making much of an effort to connect larger cities to their suburbs.
The skeletal nature of the Bell System’s network left substantial areas of
the country in which new, independent telephone companies could enter
without facing any opposition. The independents were thus free to pursue
the large number of unserved customers who had no allegiance to the Bell
System. Indeed, once the independents had established themselves in these
unserved areas, they were the ones who benefited from network economic
effects, not the Bell System. 104
The traditional account is also belied by the business strategy pursued
by the independents. If AT&T were in a dominant position, one would
expect the independents to be clamoring to interconnect with it. In fact, the
independents did not want to interconnect with AT&T any more than
AT&T wanted to interconnect with the independents. Indeed, it was only
after the Bell System changed policy and liberalized its interconnection
policies that it began to reassert its dominance. 105
The early telephone industry thus most closely resembles the type of
competition, identified in the theoretical literature in which two equally
102. Roger G. Noll & Bruce M. Owen, The Anticompetitive Uses of Regulation: United
States v. AT&T, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 290, 292 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence
J. White eds., 1989).
103. Yoo, Vertical Integration, supra note 93, at 280; Spulber & Yoo, Access to
Networks, supra note 30, at 918-19.
104. MUELLER, supra note 82, at 39-42, 55-60; Weiman & Levin, supra note 82, at 10607.
105. MUELLER, supra note 82, at 10, 51, 78-79; Richard Gabel, The Early Competitive
Era in Telephone Communications, 1893-1920, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 340, 353-54
(1969).
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sized players refuse to interconnect and instead engage in a race for the
market in which “[t]he successful competitor strives to become the
surviving monopolist.” 106 Interestingly though, this type of competition
does not lead to the delays in technology adoption and supracompetitive
returns associated with refusals to interconnect by dominant firms. It also
has the virtue of promoting the rapid build-out of new network
technologies. 107
Spurred into a race for the market, both the Bell System and the
independents began investing heavily in expanding their networks. Annual
growth rates, which had been languishing at around six percent during the
monopoly period, skyrocketed to over twenty percent during the
competitive era. 108 By 1907, the independent telephone industry had
achieved parity with the Bell System 109 and competing with Bell in fiftynine percent of cities with populations over 5,000. 110 At this point, the
independents could defeat whatever advantage AT&T might have gained
by its refusal to interconnect simply by banding together to form a network
of equal size. 111
It is thus unlikely that network economic effects played a significant
role in allowing the Bell System to reassert its dominance during the early
twentieth century. The emergence of local telephone competition has
rendered them even more inapposite today. Scholars from a wide range of
perspectives generally recognize that the anticompetitive effects associated
with network economic effects can only arise if the market is dominated by
a single, large player. When that is not the case, competition already
provides powerful incentives for networks to interconnect, and in the
absence of a dominant player, any one firm’s refusal to interconnect is
unlikely to harm competition. On the contrary, network economic effects
provide powerful incentives to interconnect because any firm refusing to do
so risks being left out in the cold. 112 The FCC embraced this reasoning
106. Gabel, supra note 105, at 354.
107. Stanley M. Besen & Joseph Farrell, Choosing How to Compete: Strategies and
Tactics in Standardization, 8 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 117, 122-24 (1994).
108. Gabel, supra note 105, at 350 tbl.4.
109. Robert Bornholz & David S. Evans, The Early History of Competition in the
Telephone Industry, in BREAKING UP BELL, supra note 86, at 7, 13.
110. MUELLER, supra note 82, at 39-42, 54-66, 69-76, 111-12; Weiman & Levin, supra
note 82, at 106-07.
111. Noll & Owen, supra note 102, at 292.
112. See Gerald R. Faulhaber, Bottlenecks and Bandwagons: Access Policy in the New
Telecommunications, in 2 HANDBOOK OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS: TECHNOLOGY
EVOLUTION AND THE INTERNET 487, 501-02 (Samit K. Majumdar et al. eds., 2005) (pointing
out that in mature markets consisting of a small number of firms of roughly equal size, “the
only stable outcome (i.e., the market equilibrium) is for all firms to interconnect”); Michael
L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM.
ECON. REV. 424, 429 (1985) (noting that “[a]s the number of firms becomes increasingly
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when declining to require wireless telephone networks to interconnect with
one another, concluding that the growth of competition obviated the need
for any regulatory intervention. 113 Thus the technological changes that have
allowed competition in local telephone service to emerge have effectively
undercut incumbents’ ability to use network economic effects to harm
competition.

C.

Vertical Exclusion

Although the entire telephone system was initially regarded as a
monopoly, the emergence of potential competition in portions of the
network raised the possibility that the Bell System would use its control
over the portions of the network that remained a natural monopoly to harm
competition in those portions of the network where competition was now
possible. Specifically, policymakers became concerned that the Bell
System would use its control over the local telephone network to harm
competition in complementary services.
Vertical exclusion was thus the central concern underlying the Part 68
rules mandating that the Bell System open its local telephone networks to
CPE manufactured by other companies. 114 The same concern motivated the
requirement that the Bell System open its local telephone networks to
competing long-distance companies. 115 It also underlay the Computer
Inquiries requirement of structural separation and equal access to
unaffiliated information service providers. 116 Each of these decisions were
reinforced by the consent decree settling the government’s case against
AT&T, which similarly mandated structural separation and equal access for
long-distance and information service providers. 117 All of these restrictions
were eventually incorporated into the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 118
which prohibited the local telephone companies formerly affiliated with the
Bell System, known as Bell Operating Companies (BOCs), from providing
long-distance services, manufacturing equipment, or engaging in two
designated information services (specifically, electronic publishing and
large,” the equilibrium in which all firms interconnect converges to perfectly competitive
equilibrium). See also Nicholas Economides, The Economics of the Internet Backbone, in 2
HANDBOOK OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS, supra, at 374, 390 (recognizing that
network economic effects give firms strong incentives to interconnect).
113. Interconnection and Resale Obligations Pertaining to Commercial Mobile Radio
Serv., Fourth Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 13523, 13534 para. 28 (2000) [hereinafter
CMRS Interconnection Order].
114. 47 C.F.R. pt. 68 (2008); see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 28-29 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
118. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996)
(codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. (2000)).
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alarm monitoring) in their home regions. The 1996 Act permitted the BOCs
to offer other information services immediately and to offer electronic
publishing so long as they did so through a separate affiliate. 119
Concerns about vertical exclusion depend on the assumption that local
telephone service remains monopolized, because without market power in
one market, the firm attempting to engage in vertical exclusion would have
nothing to use as leverage. 120 The sunset provisions of the 1996 Act reveal
the expectation that concerns about vertical exclusion would ultimately be
dissipated by the emergence of competition in local telephone service. By
their own terms, the statutory restrictions on information services expired
in 2000 and 2001. 121 The 1996 Act also eliminated the prohibition against
providing long-distance service and manufacturing equipment for BOCs
either facing facilities-based competition or satisfying a fourteen-point
competitive
checklist
establishing
that they
are
providing
nondiscriminatory access to their local telephone networks, although the
BOCs seeking to offer those services had to do so through a separate
affiliate for an additional three years. 122 The FCC has ruled that sufficient
progress has been made in every state except Alaska and Hawaii to justify
permitting BOCs to begin offering long-distance service. 123 With the
increasing competitive pressure being brought by wireless carriers and
broadband providers offering VoIP, it appears to be just a matter of time
before vertical exclusion by local telephone companies ceases to be a
regulatory concern.
In addition, certain services depend on a degree of vertical integration
that structural separation and equal access requirements render impossible.
Two persistent problems raised by the Computer Inquiries illustrate this
fact. 124 The advent of digital switching placed computing power in the
switch itself, which was capable of supporting a vast new array of vertical
switching services, such as voice mail, call waiting, call forwarding, and
advance calling. Although such services could be offered by independent
providers, they appeared to function most efficiently when their capabilities
were designed directly into the telephone switch. Allowing local telephone
companies to offer these services on an integrated basis, however, was
inconsistent with the regime of interoperability and transparency implicit in
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

47 U.S.C. §§ 271(b)(1), 273(a), 274(a), 275(a)(1).
Yoo, Vertical Integration, supra note 93, at 188.
§ 274(g)(2), § 275(a)(1).
Id. § 271(c)(2), (d)(1); § 272(f)(2); § 273(a).
FCC, BOC AUTHORIZATIONS TO PROVIDE IN-REGION INTERLATA SERVICES UNDER
SECTIONS 271 AND 272, http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/in-region_
applications/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2008).
124. Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 15-18
(2005).
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equal access and structural separation and needed an express regulatory
waiver before they could be provided in this manner. 125 Estimates of the
cost of the delay in the introduction of such services caused by regulations
to protect against vertical exclusion exceed $1 billion per year. 126
Another classic example of the problems associated with attempts to
regulate vertical exclusion is the emergence of digital transmission, during
which local telephone companies began moving away from routing traffic
on a synchronous circuit-switched basis and began to employ asynchronous
packet-switched protocols in portions of their networks. The shift to digital
transmission technologies required the network to engage in protocol
conversion at different points that again was inconsistent with the regime of
interoperability and transparency implicit in equal access and structural
separation. After considerable regulatory wrangling, the FCC concluded
that the costs of the regulations exceeded their benefits and permitted
protocol conversion, notwithstanding its inconsistency with the
commitment to vertical disintegration embodied in Computer Inquiry II. 127
These examples illustrate some of the efficiency losses associated
with attempting to regulate vertical exclusion in telecommunications.
Technological developments can cause interfaces that were once natural
points of separation between companies to shift or collapse. These costs
render all the more attractive the regulatory alternative of eliminating the
problems of vertical exclusion by promoting facilities-based competition
rather than by attempting to mandate structural separation and equal access.

D.

Ruinous/Managed Competition

Firms competing in industries characterized by high fixed costs have
long raised the specter that the market will devolve into a form of ruinous

125. Computer III Phase I Order, supra note 32, at 1112-14 paras. 313-17.
126. Jerry A. Hausman, Valuing the Effect of Regulation on New Services in
Telecommunications, in BROOKINGS PAPERS IN ECON. ACTIVITY, MICROECONOMICS: 1997 1,
14-15 (Clifford Winston, Martin N. Baily & Peter C. Reiss eds., 1997).
127. See Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Secs. 271 and 272 of the
Comm. Act of 1934, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
11 F.C.C.R. 21905, 21955-58 paras. 100-05 (1996) [hereinafter Non-Accounting Safeguards
Order], aff’d sub nom. Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 131 F.3d 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1997). See also,
Computer III Phase I Order, supra note 32, at 1100-09 paras. 289-306; Petition for Waiver
of Sec. 64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d
1057 (1985) [hereinafter Protocol Waiver Order]; Petition of AT&T Co. for Limited &
Temporary Waiver of 47 CFR Sec. 64.702 Regarding Its Provision of Unregulated Services
Externally to the AT&T-C Network, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 59 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P&F) 505 (1985) [hereinafter AT&T Waiver Petition]; Communications Protocols under
Section 64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules and Regs., Memorandum Opinion, Order and
Statement of Principles, 95 F.C.C.2d 584, 594 paras. 21-22, 595 para. 24 (1983) [hereinafter
Protocols Order].
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competition in which no firm can operate profitably. 128 Ruinous
competition hypothesizes that once firms have sunk the fixed costs needed
to enter, they will not exit so long as they can charge prices that cover their
marginal costs. The resulting competition drives prices down to marginal
cost, which in turn prevents firms from generating sufficient revenue to
recover their fixed costs. To the extent that a market is a natural monopoly,
entry by a second firm wastes resources because only one competitor will
ultimately emerge, which necessarily means that any investment in laying a
second set of wires will ultimately prove fruitless. Some sort of coordinated
action, either through collusion or government regulation, was viewed as
the only viable solution to endemic overproduction and eventual collapse
into a natural monopoly. 129
The Bell System raised the classic argument that entry by the
independents had caused the industry to engage in ruinous competition. For
example, in AT&T’s Annual Reports, company president Fredrick P. Fish
repeatedly complained that competition had driven rates too low to allow it
to recover its fixed costs. 130 Theodore N. Vail picked up this refrain after
he assumed the presidency of AT&T in 1907, complaining that
“[d]uplication of plant is a waste to the investor” and that “[d]uplication of
charges is a waste to the user.” 131 Competition simply meant “the public
must pay double rates for service, to meet double charges, on double
capital, double operating expenses and double maintenance.” 132 Concerns
about the costs to consumers from wasteful duplication also appeared in the
report of the Study that laid the foundation for the Communications Act of
1934. 133 The avoidance of wasteful duplication was reflected in the fact
that the order breaking up AT&T made no attempt to promote competition
in local telephone service 134 as well as the presumption inherent in the 1996
Act’s UNE access provisions that some facilities needed to offer local
telephone service would not be duplicated. 135

128. Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking Broadband Internet Access, 22
HARV. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2008).
129. See New York v. United States, 331 U.S. 284, 346 (1947); Interstate Commerce
Comm’n v. Inland Waterways Corp., 319 U.S. 671, 688 n.24 (1943); New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 292-94 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
130. AT&T, 1904 Annual Report 10 (1905); AT&T, 1906 Annual Report 12 (1907).
131. AT&T, 1907 Annual Report 18 (1908).
132. Id.
133. STUDY OF COMMUNICATIONS BY AN INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE, supra note
78, at 11-12.
134. United States v. W. Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 537-38 (D.D.C. 1987).
135. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 416-17 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Verizon Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S.
467, 545 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Ruinous competition has been heavily criticized as a basis for
governmental intervention. The excess capacity caused by multiple firms’
decisions to incur fixed costs simply causes incumbent firms to forego
making any further capital investments until the market returns to long-run
equilibrium. Although firms may suffer substantial losses in the short run,
the ensuing competition would yield substantial welfare benefits to
consumers in the form of lower prices, while simultaneously identifying the
most efficient firm and providing for an empirical test of whether a
particular market was in fact a natural monopoly. The only justification for
intervention would be to protect the investors in these companies, which
would violate the standard admonition that regulators should protect
competition, not competitors. It is for this reason that then-Harvard law
professor and now-Justice Stephen Breyer dismissed the rationale as an
“empty box” with no particular economic meaning or content. 136 These
criticisms have been echoed both by economists 137 and by the Supreme
Court. 138
These criticisms apply to the arguments advanced by AT&T. The
duplication of costs, about which Vail complained, is an inevitable part of
the market-based economy. As Richard Gabel noted in his landmark study
of the early telephone industry, “[a]ll competition involves some
redundancy of plant facilities and work effort. The question is whether the
pressure of competing market forces produces a better or cheaper product
than a single supply service.” 139 As the independent telephone industry
pointed out at the time, “‘[w]hat forces the business man to take two
telephones? The same thing that forces him to advertise his goods in two
newspapers in a town instead of one—to reach the people.’” 140 A

136. BREYER, supra note 5, at 29-35.
137. See, e.g., J.M. CLARK, STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF OVERHEAD COSTS (1923);
CARL KAYSEN & DONALD TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 195-97 (1959); F.W. TAUSSIG, 2
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 53-54 (3d ed. 1922); John Maurice Clark, A Contribution to the
Theory of Competitive Price, 28 Q.J. ECON. 747 (1914); F.H. Knight, Cost of Production
and Price Over Long & Short Periods, 29 J. POL. ECON. 304 (1921); Roger G. Noll,
Economic Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 1253, 1257 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
138. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 346 (1982); Nat’l
Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689-90 (1978); United States v.
Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 338 n.4 (1969); Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am.
v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150, 220-24 (1940); United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
But see Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933) (holding that
competing coal producers could form an agreement to promote efficiency so long as the
intent was not to unreasonably restrain trade), overruled by Copperweld Corp. v. Indep.
Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
139. Gabel, supra note 105, at 342.
140. MUELLER, supra note 82, at 95 (quoting 11 TELEPHONY (June 1906)).
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newspaper monopoly would obviate the need for placing advertisements in
multiple newspapers, but at the cost of lower circulation and higher prices.
The evidence suggests that, on balance, competition provided
significant benefits to consumers. Subscribers who purchased service from
both the Bell System and the independent were able to obtain access to five
to ten times the number of subscribers for a total price that was roughly the
same or less than that paid during the monopoly period. 141 At the same
time, the benefits from eliminating competition in favor of unified service
provided through a single telephone network were attenuated by the fact
that most telephone subscribers only sought to communicate with a
relatively small group of other people. Indeed, as we have explained in
detail elsewhere, heterogeneity of consumer preferences can render
equilibrium with multiple incompatible systems optimal. 142 Most
customers needed only to purchase one service, as groups tended to
segregate themselves into discrete user communities clustered on one
phone system or the other. As a result, the benefits of unifying these
systems would be minimal, and even those benefits could be easily realized
by using public pay phones or the free phone service provided by bars and
other local merchants. 143 Thus, the elimination of competition provided few
benefits to consumers.
Instead, the Bell System’s arguments are better understood as part of
what Gabel has described as a deliberate “flight from competition.” 144 By
1907, the corporate leadership of the Bell System acknowledged that its
initial strategy of trying to expand its network, cut rates, and refuse to
interconnect with the independents was a colossal failure. The price cuts
had a devastating effect on the Bell System’s profitability, with revenue
dropping from $88 per subscriber in 1905 to $43 per subscriber in 1907. 145
Establishing local telephone service in the areas it did not yet serve
required enormous amounts of capital, which the Bell System struggled to
raise. Committed as it was to a business strategy centered on long-distance
service, service provided by the Bell System required higher quality
equipment, which in turn made its local telephone networks more costly
than the independents’. In contrast, the independent companies were able to
construct systems at lower costs, financed largely by local sources of
capital raised by local residents who were able to leverage preexisting
141. MUELLER, supra note 82, at 94; Bornholz & Evans, supra note 109, at 30; Weiman
& Levin, supra note 82, at 123-24.
142. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 124, at 27-37.
143. BROCK, TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY, supra note 98, at 110; MUELLER, supra
note 82, at 82-85.
144. Gabel, supra note 105, at 358.
145. FCC, INVESTIGATIONS OF THE TEL. INDUS. IN THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 76340, at 133 (1939).
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government intervention and instead to endorse direct regulation of
telephone rates. 152
The primary beneficiary of unified service and the concomitant
elimination of price competition would not be consumers, but rather the
shareholders of the Bell System. Unification of local telephone service also
benefited those classes of business that depended on the ability to contact
regional and national business centers, such as banks, railroads, hotels, and
wholesale suppliers, and thus were the only customers who felt compelled
to purchase service from both the Bell System and the independents.
Unified service provided few benefits to small businesses and residences,
which placed a substantially lower value on the ability to contact a broader
range of people. 153 For example, in the case of Norfolk, Virginia, the Bell
System’s acquisition of the independent allowed the 700 business
customers who purchased both services to reduce their monthly charges by
twenty-five percent. 154 The 2,100 business customers who previously only
purchased one service would pay higher rates, an increase of twenty
percent for customers served by Bell prior to the merger and an increase of
one hundred percent for customers previously served by the independent. 155
It was the business users that subscribed to both systems that provided
the key political support for the government’s eventual acquiescence in the
return of monopoly. After some initial resistance, the independents decided
to cooperate with the Bell System’s efforts. Having already built out much
of the unserved areas of the country, the independents had faced a
transition to the far more demanding strategy of pursuing more intensive
development of established markets. Bell mergers with selected
independents also fragmented their ability to provide short-haul longdistance service by directly interconnecting adjacent exchanges, until the
Bell System’s so-called Vail Commitment of 1912, which promised to
leave unchanged the independent toll-line connections already established
by any acquired company. The independents’ efforts to establish their own
long-haul long-distance network were hampered by the fact that they were
not a unified enterprise, which made coordination difficult and left them
vulnerable to divide-and-conquer strategies, in addition to the Morgan
banking interests’ ability to persuade key players to withdraw their
financial support for the independents’ efforts to establish their own long152. AT&T, 1907 Annual Report at 18-19 (1908); AT&T, 1910 Annual Report at 23,
32-33 (1911); Theodore N. Vail, Public Utilities and Public Policy, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Mar. 1913, at 307, 311; FCC, INVESTIGATIONS OF THE TEL. INDUS. IN THE UNITED STATES,
H.R. Doc. No. 76-340, at 133 (1939).
153. MUELLER, supra note 82, at 83-84, 99-100; Robinson, supra note 17, at 6-7; Gabel,
supra note 105, at 355-58.
154. Weiman & Levin, supra note 82, at 123.
155. Id.
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distance network. Faced with dim prospects, the independents realized that
merger with the Bell System was their best option. 156
This change in strategy reversed the downward trend in the Bell
System’s market share. The number of noncompeting independent
telephone systems that had accepted the Bell System’s offer of
accommodation jumped from twenty-five percent to seventy-nine percent
between 1907 and 1909, and rose to eighty-nine percent by 1913. 157 The
number of cities with a population over 5,000 in which competition existed
plummeted from fifty-nine percent in 1907 to thirty-seven percent in
1913. 158 By 1934, the Bell System’s market share had once again reached
eighty percent. 159 With a few exceptions, the independent companies that
remained, for the most part, served discrete areas in which the Bell System
did not operate.
Thus, monopoly was not the justification for regulation. Regulation
was instead the justification for monopoly. Regulation, moreover, proved
ineffective at curbing rates. Consider state regulation of intrastate rates.
Debates over the proper method for determining the rate base prevented
state regulatory authorities from developing a coherent basis for setting
rates. The complexity of the corporate structure, in which the parent
company owned the operating companies and rented telephone equipment
to them through Western Electric, made it difficult for individual state
authorities to discern each operating company’s actual financial results, let
alone regulate their profits. The regulatory challenge was made all the more
difficult by the fact that state commissions were almost completely
dependent on the Bell System for the information they needed and that the
parent company was regulated at the federal level, while the operating
companies were regulated at the state level and Western Electric was not
regulated at all. 160 Thus, even histories of the early telephone industry that
are largely sympathetic to the Bell System understood that “regulation,
coming late and still almost non-existent in several of the States, has had
relatively little effect in influencing the growth and financial success of the
Bell telephone system.” 161
Federal regulation of interstate rates was similarly unsuccessful. In
the words of Gerald Brock, “[t]he early FCC was an ideal regulatory
156. MUELLER, supra note 82, at 75-76, 78-79, 109-13; Bornholz & Evans, supra note
109, at 16-17, 28; Gabel, supra note 105, at 350, 353-54, 357; Weiman & Levin, supra note
82, at 122-24.
157. MUELLER, supra note 82, at 110.
158. Id. at 111-12.
159. BROCK, TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY, supra note 98, at 174.
160. 1934 House Hearings, supra note 17, at 69 (statement of Paul Walker); BROCK,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY, supra note 98, at 159-61.
161. STEHMAN, supra note12, at 262.
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agency from AT&T’s perspective. It provided very little control or
restriction on AT&T’s interstate rates and activities but it did help prevent
competition from arising.” 162 For the first three decades following the
enactment of the 1934 Act, the FCC failed to undertake any formal
investigations or to create any systematic basis for evaluating the
reasonableness of AT&T’s rates. Instead, the FCC engaged in a system of
“continuing surveillance,” in which long-distance rates were established
through informal negotiations between AT&T and the agency. 163
The experience of the early telephone industry eloquently
demonstrates why the conventional economic wisdom now rejects ruinous
competition as the basis for regulation. Eventually, regulated monopoly
was justified by the ability to use cross-subsidies to support providing
service in areas that would not otherwise have service. Although the
conventional wisdom holds that promoting universal service in this manner
was an objective since the enactment of the Communications Act of
1934, 164 such cross-subsidies were not mentioned during the legislative
deliberations over the Act and did not emerge until the 1970s, when AT&T
began to face competition from new long-distance providers. The timing
suggests that relying on cross-subsidies is again better understood as a
flight from competition rather than as a principled justification for
regulated monopoly. 165
Although policymakers have rejected ruinous competition as a
justification for using regulation to eliminate competition altogether, they
have attempted to manage competition for the purpose of facilitating entry.
For example, the FCC has long imposed asymmetric regulation that
subjected incumbents to rate regulation even after competition had
emerged, while refusing to subject new entrants to the same strictures. 166
The FCC was concerned that as long as the incumbent remained dominant,
it continued to possess sufficient market power to offer supracompetitive
prices. The advent of competition provided an additional twist, however,
that made rate regulation even more difficult to enforce. The FCC was also
concerned that dominant carriers might engage in predatory pricing.

162. Gerald W. Brock, Historical Overview, in 1 HANDBOOK OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS
ECONOMICS 43, 53 (Martin E. Cave et al. eds., 2002).
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., STUDY OF COMMUNICATIONS BY AN INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE,
supra note 72, at 9; BONBRIGHT, supra note 84, at 114-15, 383 n.27; TEMIN, supra note 22,
at 16.
165. MUELLER, supra note 82, at 150-64.
166. See generally Scott M. Schoenwald, Regulating Competition in the Interexchange
Telecommunications Market: The Dominant/Nondominant Carrier Approach and the
Evolution of Forbearance, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 367 (1997) (providing an overview of the
FCC’s rulings on dominance/nondominance).
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Regulators were thus simultaneously concerned that dominant firms might
charge prices that were either too high or too low. 167
The most prominent example of asymmetric rate regulation was with
respect to long distance during the 1980s, during which time competition
was just beginning to become established. 168 For example, until 1987, the
FCC required AT&T to pay access charges to local telephone companies
that were fifty-five percent higher than those paid by other long-distance
carriers. 169 In addition, the FCC exempted new long-distance companies,
such as MCI and Sprint, from most tariffing requirements, while continuing
to subject AT&T to rate regulation until its dominance over the longdistance market dissipated in 1995. 170 The courts invalidated the FCC’s
detariffing decisions, ruling that the agency lacked the power to exempt
any long-distance carriers from rate regulation. 171 The 1996 Act gave the
FCC the discretion to forbear from enforcing regulations it found to be
unnecessary to protect consumers or to promote the public interest. 172 The
FCC exercised this new authority to forbear from enforcing the tariffing
requirements against long-distance carriers, a ruling that was eventually
upheld by the courts. 173
In addition, the FCC also attempted to facilitate entry by new longdistance companies by requiring AT&T to lease portions of its longdistance network to its competitors. Although the FCC initially invoked a
number of different rationales, the concern that has emerged as the most
167. Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Servs. &
Facilities Authorizations Therefor [sic], First Report and Order, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, 21 para. 56
(1980).
168. Indeed, some commentators have suggested that the FCC’s regulatory efforts did
more to promote long-distance competition than did technological change. These scholars
argue that by the time of the breakup of AT&T, fiber optics had replaced microwave as the
primary technology for long-distance transmission. Because this is essentially a wireline
technology, it once again bore the natural monopoly characteristics. See PAUL W.
MACAVOY, THE FAILURE OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATION TO ESTABLISH COMPETITION IN
LONG-DISTANCE TELEPHONE SERVICE 93-98 (1996); Peter W. Huber, Telephone
Competition, and the Candice-Coated Monopoly, REGULATION, Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 34; Paul
W. MacAvoy & Kenneth Robinson, Wining by Losing: The AT&T Settlement and Its Impact
of Telecommunications, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 31 (1983).
169. MTS and WATS Market Structure, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 97 F.C.C.2d
834, 860-62 paras. 78-88 (1984), aff’d in relevant part sub nom. Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory
Util. Comm’rs v. FCC, 737 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
170. Motion of AT&T Corp. to Be Reclassified as a Non-Dominant Carrier, Order, 11
F.C.C.R. 3271 (1995).
171. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994); AT&T Co. v. FCC,
978 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1992); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
172. 47 U.S.C. § 160 (2000).
173. Policy and Rules Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace, Second
Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 20730 (1996), clarified, 12 F.C.C.R. 20787 (1997), aff’d sub
nom. MCI WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 209 F.3d 760 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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important was that the capital requirements needed to establish longdistance service might impede new entrants from offering nationwide
service from the outset, which in turn made it more difficult for new
entrants to compete with AT&T. The FCC therefore imposed regulations
providing new entrants with access to portions of AT&T’s network to fill
in the transitional coverage gaps that existed as they built out their
networks in the hope that new entrants would use access as a stepping stone
to true facilities-based competition. 174 Congress and the FCC also invoked
this rationale to justify the provisions of the 1996 Act mandating access to
local telephone networks. 175
As we discussed in our earlier work, access requirements can be quite
problematic from the standpoint of both dynamic efficiency and
administrability. 176 As Justice Breyer noted in his separate opinion in Iowa
Utilities Board:
[A] sharing requirement may diminish the original owner’s
incentive to keep up or to improve the property by depriving the
owner of the fruits of value-creating investment, research, or
labor. . . . [One cannot] guarantee that firms will undertake the
investment necessary to produce complex technological
innovations knowing that any competitive advantage deriving
from those innovations will be dissipated by the sharing
requirement. 177
A majority of the Supreme Court later echoed Justice Breyer’s
concerns about access requirements’ impact on the incumbents’ incentives
to reinvest in their network in its 2004 Trinko decision. 178 In so doing, the
Court added the additional concern that enforced sharing also deterred
investment by potential new entrants as well, warning that “[c]ompelling
such firms to share the source of their advantage . . . may lessen the
incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those
economically beneficial facilities.” 179

174. Reg. Policies Concerning Resale & Shared Use of Common Carrier Domestic
Public Switched Network Services, Report and Order, 83 F.C.C.2d 167, 181-82 para. 32,
(1980), aff’d sub nom. S. Pac. Comm. Co. v. FCC, 682 F.2d 232 (D.C. Cir. 1982). See
generally HUBER, KELLOGG & THORNE, supra note 2, § 9.4.2.
175. S. REP. NO. 104-230, at 147 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); Local Competition Order, supra
note 50, at 15509 para. 12; Verizon Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 491-92 (2002).
176. See Yoo, Vertical Integration, supra note 93, at 244-47, 268-69; Spulber & Yoo,
Access to Networks, supra note 30, at 896-97, 931-33, 970-76.
177. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 428-29 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part) (citation omitted); accord Verizon, 535 U.S. at 55051 (Breyer, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (noting that compelling incumbents
to share the cost-reducing benefits of a successful innovation destroys the incumbent’s
incentives to innovate in the first place).
178. Verizon Comm., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
179. Id. at 407-08.
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The concerns identified by the Supreme Court underscore the extent
to which access requirements mandate that regulators strike a very delicate
balance. If access prices are set too high, no one will avail themselves of
the opportunity, and mandating access will simply impose costs without
providing any corresponding benefits. If access prices are set too low, new
entrants will forego facilities-based investment and will instead simply take
advantage of the pricing offered through regulation. Investment distortions
can only be avoided if access prices are set at the precise level that would
mimic competitive outcomes. Establishing what those prices would be is
extremely difficult in the absence of external, unregulated markets that can
serve as benchmarks. It is also difficult when regulators are dependent on
the regulated entity for most of their information, as is often the case in
local telephony. Moreover, pricing challenges are likely to be particularly
problematic in industries that are technologically dynamic.
A growing empirical literature confirms that the access requirements
imposed by the 1996 Act have failed to promote investment in new local
telephone facilities or that new entrants have used access regulation as a
stepping stone toward full facilities-based competition. 180 The consequence
is that a growing number of advocates who previously supported
mandating access to telecommunications networks have become
increasingly skeptical that doing so will provide any substantial economic
benefits. 181

IV. THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF ACCESS TO LOCAL TELEPHONE
NETWORKS
Another major problem with the current approach to regulating access
to local telephone networks is the absence of any theory of network
180. See generally Augustin J. Ros & Karl McDermott, Are Residential Local Exchange
Prices Too Low?, in EXPANDING COMPETITION IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES 149 (Michael A.
Crew ed., 2000); Robert W. Crandall. Allan T. Ingraham & Hal J. Singer, Do Unbundling
Policies Discourage CLEC Facilities-Based Investment?, 4 TOPICS IN ECON. ANALYSIS &
POL’Y 14 (June 7, 2004), available at http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/topics/vol4/iss1/
art14/; Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, Did Mandatory Unbundling Achieve Its
Purpose? Empirical Evidence from Five Countries, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 173
(2005); Thomas W. Hazlett, Rivalrous Telecommunications Networks With and Without
Mandatory Sharing, 58 FED. COMM. L.J. 477 (2006); James Zolnierek, James Eisner & Ellen
Burton, An Empirical Examination of Entry Patterns in Local Telephone Markets, 19 J.
REG. ECON. 143 (2001); Robert S. Pindyck, Mandatory Unbundling and Irreversible
Investment in Telecom Networks (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
10287, 2004), http://www.nber.org/papers/w10287.pdf; James Eisner & Dale E. Lehman,
Regulatory Behavior and Competitive Entry (2001) (unpublished manuscript presented at
the 14th Annual Western Conference, Center for Research in Regulated Industries),
http://www.aestudies.com/library/elpaper.pdf.
181. See, e.g., Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, The Bell Doctrine: Applications in
Telecommunications, Electricity, and Other Network Industries, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1249
(1999).
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configuration. As noted earlier, the current cost-based approach has the
effect of treating each network element as if it existed in a vacuum without
taking into account the interactions between individual elements that can
cause networks to behave in unpredictable ways. The lack of a theory of
network configuration makes it impossible to assess how altering the costs
of particular elements and introducing additional flows into a network can
change optimal network design, network capacity, and network reliability.
It also obscures the fact that different types of access can have drastically
different effects on transaction costs.
In this Part, we employ a conceptual framework that we have
developed based on a branch of mathematics known as graph theory to
analyze access to local telephone networks. Our approach captures one of
networks’ key attributes: the manner in which they can compensate for
changes by rerouting traffic in other ways. This causes networks to behave
like complex systems that cannot be understood by considering their
individual components in isolation.
Graph theory reduces networks into two types of elements. 182
“Nodes” are points from which network flows begin, end, or are redirected.
Nodes are connected by “links.” The nodes in a last-mile broadband
network include the servers that provide Internet applications and content,
the host computers operated by the end-users who are the ultimate
consumers of applications and content, and the routers in the middle of the
network that determine along which path particular traffic will flow. The
links in a last-mile broadband network are the wires (or, in the case of
wireless Internet, the spectrum channels) that interconnect these servers,
host computers, and routers. The cost, capacity, and location of each link
and node can vary.
Depicting networks as systems of links and nodes makes it possible to
analyze how to design networks to deliver the highest levels of
performance at the lowest cost. For example, the architecture that connects
all of the nodes in a network with the fewest links is known as a “spanning
tree.” For a network of n nodes, there exist nn–2 possible spanning trees,
where n is greater than or equal to two. 183 Algorithms exist that make it
possible to sort through all of the possible spanning trees to identify the
“minimum spanning tree,” which is the network design that connects all of
the nodes in the network at the least cost. 184 In addition, network owners

182. For our initial discussion of these principles, see Spulber & Yoo, Graph Theory
Approach, supra note 9, at 1693-1707.
183. See Arthur Cayley, A Theorem on Trees, 23 Q.J. PURE & APPLIED MATHEMATICS
376 (1889).
184. See, e.g., R.C. Prim, Shortest Connection Networks and Some Generalizations, 36
BELL SYS. TECH. J. 1389 (1957).
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have the option of deploying higher-volume server or transmission
technologies if the reduction in variable cost and improvement in
performance is large enough to justify incurring the additional capital
expense. Together, these concepts help determine the least-cost architecture
for delivering different amounts of network capacity. 185
Network performance is determined not only by its cost and capacity;
it also depends on the network’s reliability, typically measured by its
ability to guarantee certain minimum levels of bandwidth. One of the
limitations of cost-minimizing architectures like minimum spanning trees is
that every pair of nodes is connected by a single path. As a result, costminimizing architectures are vulnerable to congestion because the
saturation of any network element will force the packets into a queue. The
resulting delays will necessarily degrade network performance. Ensuring
minimum levels of reliability becomes more difficult as the variability of
the relevant traffic flows increases. Network owners can increase network
reliability by adding additional links that create “cycles,” which exist when
more than one path connects two nodes. Although the introduction of such
redundancy increases network cost, it also promotes network reliability by
allowing traffic to be rerouted along different paths if any particular
pathway becomes congested. 186
Analyzing networks in this manner permits network owners to choose
architectures that deliver the levels of network capacity and reliability that
customers demand at the lowest cost. Mandating access to the network can
adversely affect each of these dimensions. For example, access mandates
can alter the volume and patterns of network traffic, either by introducing
new additional traffic into the network or by diverting traffic outside the
network until the network owner no longer finds it beneficial to employ
higher-volume, cost-reducing technologies. In addition, certain types of
access can reduce the effective capacity of particular network elements by
occupying some of its functionality. The net effect can alter the costs of
operating the network as well as the network’s optimal configuration. 187
Graph theory also shows how networks can ameliorate some of these
problems. To the extent that some resources are slack, the network can
reroute traffic along other pathways to compensate for any unexpected
changes in network volume or network element capacity. Redirecting
traffic in this manner can increase the cost of operating the network and can
increase congestion, thereby degrading network performance in those
portions of the network through which traffic is rerouted—even in areas of
the network that may be located far from the node from which access is
185. See Spulber & Yoo, Graph Theory Approach, supra note 9, at 1701-03.
186. See id. at 1699-1701.
187. See id. at 1698-99, 1709, 1717.
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sought. Graph theory thus demonstrates how imposing an access
requirement can have a dramatic impact on portions of the network that are
discontinuous with the portion of a network affected by the access
requirement. In so doing, it reflects the insight that networks are complex
systems that can only be understood by taking into account the relationship
between each component, as well as the projected traffic flows. 188
As a theoretical matter, graph theory could be used as a basis for
calculating prices directly based on the capacity of each network element
and the flows being introduced into the system. 189 The multidirectional
nature of the traffic flows in a local telephone network renders direct
calculation of the resulting prices intractable.
To say that graph theory cannot be used to generate prices does not
mean that it might not yield valuable intuitions. For example, graph theory
can model how different types of access can have a different impact on
transaction costs. According to the Coasean theory of the firm, every entity
decides whether to perform particular production functions internally or to
contract them out based on which solution minimizes transaction costs. 190
Access mandates disrupt the firm’s natural boundaries by forcing the
network to externalize functions that it would otherwise perform internally.
In addition, the fact that access necessarily presupposes that some traffic
will originate and terminate outside of the network will make it more
difficult for the network owner to obtain the information about projected
network flows needed to determine the optimal network design. The fact
that this information is held by the network owner’s competitors also raises
the possibility that the party seeking access may attempt to use that
information to its own strategic advantage.
Many of the insights on how mandating network access affects
network costs, capacity, reliability, and transaction costs can be captured by
classifying access regimes into the five categories depicted in Figure 1: (1)
retail access, (2) wholesale access, (3) interconnection access, (4) platform
access, and (5) unbundled access. Network components owned and
operated by the network are represented as solid lines and nodes. The
portions of the network obtained through access requirements are depicted
by dotted lines. 191

188. See id. at 1705-06, 1710-11.
189. See id. at 1719-21.
190. See R.H. Coase, The Theory of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 394-98 (1937).
191. Figure 1 was originally printed in Spulber & Yoo, Graph Theory Approach, supra
note 9, at 638-39.
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Figure 1. The Five Forms of Access to Networks

A

A

Retail access
(final customer A)

B

Wholesale access
(wholesaler B and
final customer A)

I

II

Interconnection access
(reciprocal connection of networks I and II)

C
A

B

Platform access (for final
customer A and supplier
of complements B)

Unbundled access
(for competitor C)

The categories vary with the type of entity (e.g., customers,
competitors, or providers of complementary services), as well as the extent
of the network to which access is provided. A close analysis of the different
types of access reveals that each has a different impact on network demand,
cost, configuration, capacity, reliability, and transaction costs. A better
understanding of how the impact of each type of access varies provides
insights into the relative costs and benefits associated with each type of
access.
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Retail Access

Retail access represents perhaps the most common form of access
imposed on telecommunications providers. 192 It provides every end-user
the right to benefit from the network’s services on the same terms and
conditions as other end-users. While the FCC has largely deregulated retail
access for interstate services, state public utility commissions have
continued to mandate retail access to local telephone networks. Although
new carriers are often allowed to pick and choose among their customers,
the incumbent local telephone company is typically designated the “carrier
of last resort” and is unable to deny service to anyone who requests it.
Because carriers could render retail access a nullity simply by charging
exorbitant prices, retail access is generally accompanied by direct
regulation of retail rates. 193
Retail access interferes with a network owner’s ability to manage its
network. Network owners configure their network based on the predicted
level of network demand to provide service that satisfies consumers’
expectations about reliability at the least cost. Unanticipated increases in
demand leaves the network owner with the option of increasing network
capacity, refusing to accept new customers, rationing demand by increasing
prices, or by bringing demand back into line with supply by allowing
service to degrade. Although expanding network capacity remains the best
long-term solution, the simple reality that network capacity cannot be
expanded instantaneously means that that option may not be a short-run
option. Retail access has the effect of foreclosing the second and third
solutions by preventing the network owner from refusing customers and by
limiting the prices it can charge.
In addition, designating the incumbent as the carrier of last resort
gives rise to a moral hazard problem that has been termed “the return of the
‘prodigal son.’” 194 In effect, retail access creates the possibility that a
customer that leaves the incumbent for a competitor might return, in which
case the incumbent would have no choice but to provide service. An
incumbent whose customers demand certain levels of quality will thus have
to maintain excess capacity as insurance against this possibility. The
resulting distortion in the optimal network configuration requires the
incumbent to cross-subsidize its competitors. More importantly, by forcing

192. For a more complete exposition on retail access, see id. at 639-40, 647-50, 661-62.
193. See id. at 639-40; Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Mandating Access to
Telecom and the Internet: The Hidden Side of Trinko, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1822, 1878-79
(2007).
194. J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE
REGULATORY CONTRACT 125-26 (1997).
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the network owner to deviate from the optimal network configuration, retail
access inevitably results in a cost increase.
The rate regulation inevitably associated with retail access has raised
additional implementation problems. Regulators have traditionally used a
cost-of-service approach according to the following formula:

R = O + Br
where R is the total revenue the carrier is allowed to generate, O is the
carrier’s operating expenses on which the carrier is not allowed to earn a
rate of return (such as taxes, wages, energy costs, and depreciation), B is
the rate base of capital investment on which the carrier is allowed to earn a
rate of return, and r is the appropriate rate of return. The rates are then
determined by dividing the total revenue that the carrier is allowed to earn
by the number of units consumers are expected to demand.
Although this formula is easy to state, regulators and courts have long
recognized that it is exceedingly difficult to apply. As an initial matter,
determining the appropriate rate of return has proven quite difficult because
such a determination depends on identifying other ventures bearing similar
risk. This determination is complicated by the fact that small differences in
rates of return can have dramatic effects on the total revenue that the carrier
is allowed to generate.
Determining the proper rate base has also proven to be a significant
regulatory challenge. Ratemaking authorities initially calculated the rate
base as “fair value,” usually conceived as the replacement cost of the
network, which allowed the rate base to reflect changes in value. 195 The
problem was that replacement cost was difficult to administer, typically
devolving into a battle between experts. Determining how much particular
configurations of network elements would cost on the current market raised
difficult problems of proof. In addition, changes in demand and technology
would often render particular facilities obsolete or would imply a very
difficult network configuration. The fair value approach left unclear
whether the rate base would be based on the reproduction cost of the
network as actually configured or of a hypothetical network configured in
the most efficient manner. The Supreme Court has called calculating the
appropriate rate base an “embarrassing question” 196 as well as a “laborious
and baffling task.” 197
195. Although using replacement cost as the rate base is associated with Smyth v. Ames,
169 U.S. 466, 546 (1898), it did not become clearly established until the next year in San
Diego Land & Town Co. v. City of National City, 174 U.S. 739, 757 (1899). See generally
Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era: Lessons from the Controversy Over
Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 187, 227-31 (1984).
196. Smyth, 169 U.S. at 546.
197. Missouri ex rel. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S. 276, 292 (1923)
(Brandeis, J., concurring in the judgment).
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The speculative nature of determining replacement cost led Justice
Brandeis to propose basing the rate base on historical cost. 198 While
recognizing that historical cost was less economically suited to reflecting
changes in value, it had the virtue of being easier to administer. At the
same time, this approach limited the rate base to investments that were
“prudent,” a determination that tends to be fraught with hindsight bias. 199
Regulators and courts have struggled with the proper methodology for
calculating the rate base ever since. 200
Cost-of-service ratemaking also induces a number of systematic
inefficiencies. As an initial matter, cost-plus pricing regimes give firms
little incentive to economize. Firms, moreover, are allowed to earn a rate of
return on capital expenses, but not on operating expenses. Most firms
usually have the choice to use production processes that are more or less
capital intensive. The ratemaking methodology discussed above thus
introduces a bias in favor of capital-intensive solutions, even when other
solutions would be more efficient. 201 Some regulators have attempted to
eliminate these distortions by introducing price-cap regulation, in which the
prices firms are allowed to charge do not depend on actual costs.
Determining initial price levels and price adjustments in subsequent years
has proven to be extremely difficult. 202 The empirical literature is divided
on whether price caps lead to lower or higher rates. 203
Retail access can also dull competitive forces in other ways. The
filing of tariffs requires local telephone companies to give their competitors
advance notice of any changes in strategy. In addition, collusion is easier to
maintain when products are undifferentiated and when the prices charged
are visible. The tariffing process serves both of these functions and even
198. Id. at 293-95 & 294 n.6.
199. Id.
200. See Siegel, supra note 195, at 224–59 (tracing the history of the battle over proper
way to calculate cost for ratemaking purposes).
201. See Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory
Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1053 (1962).
202. See, e.g., U.S. Tel. Ass’n v. FCC, 188 F.3d 521, 524-27 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Jeffrey I.
Bernstein & David E. Sappington, Setting the X Factor in Price-Cap Regulation Plans, 16 J.
REG. ECON. 5 (1999); Gregory J. Vogt, Cap-Sized: How the Promise of the Price Cap
Voyage to Competition Was Lost in a Sea of Good Intentions, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 349
(1999).
203. For studies concluding that price caps lead to lower rates, see Robert Kaestner &
Brenda Kahn, The Effects of Regulation and Competition on the Price of AT&T Intrastate
Telephone Service, 2 J. REG. ECON. 363 (1990); Alan D. Mathios & Robert P. Rogers, The
Impact of Alternative Forms of State Regulation of AT&T on Direct-Dial, Long-Distance
Telephone Rates, 20 RAND J. ECON. 437 (1989). For studies concluding the contrary, see
Jaison R. Abel, Entry into Regulated Monopoly Markets: The Development of a Competitive
Fringe in the Local Telephone Markets, 45 J.L. & ECON. 289 (2002); Christopher R. Knittel,
Regulatory Restructuring and Incumbent Price Dynamics: The Case of U.S. Local
Telephone Markets, 86 REV. ECON. & STAT. 614 (2004).
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places the state public utility commission in position to punish any
deviations from the cartel price. Even absent overt collusion, standardizing
products and increasing price transparency facilitates non-cooperative
oligopolistic behavior as well.
Retail access can also foreclose welfare-enhancing forms of price
discrimination. 204 When fixed costs are large relative to variable costs—as
is traditionally the case in local telephone service—the average cost curve
lies above the marginal cost curve over the entire industry output. Thus,
any price that allows the network owner to cover its costs necessarily
creates some degree of deadweight loss. Discriminatory pricing regimes,
such as Ramsey pricing, 205 can ameliorate this deadweight loss by
allocating a larger proportion of the fixed costs to those customers whose
demand is most inelastic and allocating a smaller proportion to those
customers who are most price sensitive. In fact, price discrimination can
theoretically lead to efficient outcomes if fixed costs are allocated in
perfect inverse proportion to elasticity of demand.
Retail access can also increase transaction costs. Historically, many of
the transaction costs have been the direct costs of participating in the
tariffing process. Retail access also increases transaction costs indirectly.
As an initial matter, tariffing provides incentives for competitors to
challenge rates even when those challenges are unlikely to succeed on the
merits. To the extent that retail access requires that all customers pay
uniform rates for uniform services, it also limits network owners’ ability to
customize their offerings to the needs of particular customers.
As noted earlier, retail access can also adversely affect the incentives
for both incumbents and competitors to invest in network capacity. If retail
access prices are set too high, they will have no effect. If retail access
prices are set too low, competitors will find entry and expansion of their
networks unremunerative because the regulated price will dampen
customers’ incentives to change networks. At the same time, low access
prices reduce the incumbent’s incentives to reinvest in their networks as
well. The alternative is to follow the more orthodox mechanism of allowing
the presence of short-run supracompetitive returns to signal competitors
that the market is in long-run disequilibrium and to provide incentives for
them to expand production. This mechanism can only function if retail
access prices are set at market levels.
The best way to promote economic efficiency would be to base retail
access rates on the price of local telephone service on the open market.
204. Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality, Consumers, and Innovation, 2008 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. (forthcoming 2008).
205. See F.P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J. 47, 58-59
(1927).
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Although local telephone service has long been regarded as a natural
monopoly in which direct competition is impossible, the emergence of
platform competition has begun to provide a wide range of possible
external markets that can serve as bases for determining market value. New
entrants have followed the lead of the CAPs and have constructed fiberoptic networks that offer increasing competition with the network operated
by the incumbent local exchange carriers (LEC). 206
Even more importantly, providers of wireless telephone services have
successfully emerged as direct competitors to the incumbent LECs. The
FCC chose to deploy the first generation of wireless devices, comprised of
analog cellular telephony, by only issuing two licenses per city, with one of
those licenses automatically going to the incumbent LEC servicing that
city. 207 As a result, wireless initially offered only modest improvements to
the competitive environment. The arrival of second generation wireless
devices, known as “personal communication services” (PCS), significantly
increased the number of competitive options. 208 The result is that the
wireless telephone industry has become highly competitive, with ninetythree percent of the U.S. population able to choose from among four
different wireless providers. 209 As a result, Congress preempted state
regulation of wireless rates in 1993. 210 Once third generation wireless
devices (3G) are fully deployed, competition in the wireless industry is
likely to provide sufficient competition to drive market-prices towards
efficient levels.
Federal regulatory authorities have been surprisingly reluctant to
regard wireless as a competitor to traditional local telephone service. For
example, the legislative history of the 1996 Act indicated that competition
from cellular telephone companies should not be considered when
determining whether an incumbent local telephone company faced
sufficient competition to justify releasing it from the prohibition on

206. Evan Ramstead & Kortney Stringer, Road Kill: In Race to Lay Fiber, Telecom
Firms, Wreak Havoc on City Streets, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2001, at A1 (describing recent
efforts to lay fiber in Atlanta, Austin, Boston, Cincinnati, Dallas, Kansas City, San Antonio,
Portland, Richmond, and Washington, D.C.).
207. Use of the Bands 825-845 MHz & 870-890 MHz for Cellular Comm. Syst., Second
Report and Order, 86 F.C.C.2d 469, 476-93 paras. 15-47 (1981).
208. Amendment of the Comm’n’s Rules to Establish New Personal Comm. Serv.,
Second Report and Order, 8 F.C.C.R. 7700, 7732-33 paras. 73-77 (1993).
209. Implementation of Section 6002(b) of Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993:
Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to Commercial
Mobile Services, Eleventh Report, 21 F.C.C.R. 10947, app. A, tbl.6 (2006).
210. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, sec. 6002, §
332(c)(3)(A), 107 Stat. 312, 394-95 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A)) (“no State or
local government shall have any authority to regulate the entry of or the rates charged by
any commercial mobile service”).
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offering long-distance services. 211 State regulators followed a similar
pattern. When Qwest asked the Idaho Public Utility Commission (PUC) to
deregulate their rates in light of the emergence of competition from
wireless, the Idaho PUC found evidence that cell phones are functionally
equivalent and competitively priced with Qwest’s local service
unpersuasive. 212
Regulators have begun to relax this assumption over time. For
example, the FCC acknowledged in 1998 that wireless is a direct
competitor to wireline local telephone service after the deployment of
PCS. 213 Most states have completely deregulated local telephone service
provided to large business customers, which has become quite competitive.
State regulators are also inching toward deregulating local telephone
service for residences and small businesses. 214 Once that occurs, the
distortions associated with retail access will disappear.

B.

Wholesale Access

Wholesale access is a right given to a network owner’s competitors to
purchase services normally sold by the network at retail and resell those
services to end-users. 215 Policymakers have also experimented with various
forms of wholesale access over the years. The issue first arose when the
New York Public Service Commission and the FCC approved Rochester
Telephone’s voluntary decision to divest its local telephone network into a
separate company that would offer basic network services to all comers on
a wholesale basis. 216 Wholesale access was mandated without structural
separation by the resale provisions of the 1996 Act, which required all
211. H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 147 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (noting that neither cellular
service nor resale of a BOC’s local exchange services would satisfy the statutory “facilitiesbased competitor requirement”).
212. See Application of Qwest Corp. for Deregulation of Basic Local Exchange Rates,
Order No. 29360, 2003 WL 22417269 (Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm’n Oct. 20, 2003).
213. Application of BellSouth Corp., BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., and BellSouth Long
Distance, Inc., for Provision of In-Region, InterLATA Serv. in La., Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 20599, 20622-23 paras. 29-33 (1998); accord Application by SBC
Comm., Inc., Nev. Bell Tel. Co., and Southwestern Bell Comm. Serv., Inc., for
Authorization to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in Nev., Memorandum Opinion
and Order 18 F.C.C.R. 7196, 7206-10 paras. 18-26 (2003); Application by Qwest Comm.
Int’l, Inc., for Authorization to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in N.M., Or., &
S.D., Memorandum Opinion and Order 18 F.C.C.R. 7325, 7334-42 paras. 18-31 (2003).
214. Tardiff, supra note 88, at 125.
215. For a more complete exposition on retail access, see Spulber & Yoo, Network
Regulation, supra note 10, at 640-41, 650-56, 662-69.
216. Petition of Rochester Tel. Corp. for Approval of Proposed Restructuring Plan,
Opinion and Order Approving Joint Stipulation Agreement, 160 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 554
(N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n 1994), aff’d Rochester Tel. Corp., Order, 10 F.C.C.R. 6776, 77
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 539 (1995) (The company’s more advanced service offerings were
divested into a standalone company called Frontier Telecommunications of Rochester).
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companies providing local telephone service on the day the statute was
enacted “to offer for resale at wholesale rates any telecommunications
service that the carrier provides at retail to subscribers.” 217 The
Pennsylvania PUC, while rejecting requests to divide Verizon’s wholesale
and retail units into separate companies, nonetheless required Verizon to
provide wholesale access to Verizon’s competitors. 218
For the reasons we discussed at greater length in our previous
work, 219 wholesale access can adversely affect network performance. As
noted in the discussion on retail access, unexpected deviations in demand
can alter the optimal network configuration. The fact that demand under
wholesale access depends on two prices—both the price of retail and
wholesale access—renders the impact of wholesale access on network
demand ambiguous. Depending on these two prices, network demand may
either increase or decrease, which in turn adversely affects network cost,
capacity, and reliability of the network. Either result will have an adverse
impact on the efficiency with which the network owner can provide
service.
By externalizing the marketing functions, wholesale access can also
increase transaction costs. At a minimum, wholesale access requires local
telephone companies who were not already offering wholesale access
services to the public to establish new systems through which competitors
can order wholesale access and to track the quantity of services being
provided. Furthermore, according to the Coasean theory of the firm, 220
network owners minimize transaction costs by internalizing functions if,
and only if, the internal monitoring and organizational costs associated with
producing a particular input internally are lower than the transaction costs
to contract for a particular service externally. Indeed, we see a wide variety
of arrangements with respect to local telephone service. Consider the
wireless telephone industry, for example. In some cases, wireless
companies sell part of their output to consumers through proprietary
outlets, while simultaneously selling part of their output through
independent retailers, such as Circuit City, Radio Shack, and Best Buy. In
addition, some wireless providers voluntarily provide wholesale access to
mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs), which buy network services
wholesale and combine them with other services, such as customized
handsets and priority placement of certain content, to provide a unique
217. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(4)(A) (2000). That this provision is what we call a wholesale
access provision follows from the fact that the statute limits this form of access to services
“provide[d] at retail to subscribers who are not telecommunications carriers.”
Id. It is thus restricted to end customers.
218. See Verizon Pa., Inc., Order, 95 Pa. P.U.C. 301 (Pa. Publ. Util. Comm’n 2001).
219. Spulber & Yoo, Network Regulation, supra note 10, at 656.
220. See R.H. Coase, The Theory of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 394-98 (1937).
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product for the customer. Wholesale access disrupts this balance by forcing
local network owners to make their entire networks available at wholesale
prices even when it is transaction-cost minimizing for them to do so.
Congress thought that this non-facilities-based competition made
possible by wholesale access might be the only form of competition
possible in many markets in which a facilities-based competitor was
unlikely to emerge in the near term. 221 As the D.C. Circuit has noted,
wholesale access provides a “completely synthetic” form of competition. 222
Because all firms are providing service on the same network, there is no
opportunity for firms to compete either by lowering cost or by providing
innovations in service. Herbert Hovenkamp describes the type of
competition in the following terms:
Imagine that a town has only one seller of bananas, which is the
local Kroger grocery store. Seeking to promote banana
competition, the town passes a banana competition ordinance
requiring Kroger to sell bananas at a steeply discounted
wholesale price to individual entrepreneurs who push banana
carts around the store, perhaps underselling Kroger itself by a
few cents. In this case Kroger supplies the store facility, storage,
heat, light, and even the bananas themselves, with the small
sellers supplying little more than their labor.
The banana competition ordinance simply confuses
competition with large numbers of retailers. True banana
competition would require individual stores with their own
facilities, purchasing bananas on the market and retailing them
to consumers. Nevertheless, this is what the 1996
Telecommunications Act does. Small CLECs can lease most of
their inputs from the Bells and even locate some of their
equipment on Bell property. They are entitled to purchase the
equipment and services they need at regulated wholesale prices,
and then resell the services in competition with the Bells. 223
It is for this reason that most commentators have found little value in
the type of competition induced by wholesale access. 224 Under wholesale
access, the only way that providers can compete with one another is by
squeezing their profit margins until prices converge to cost. Regulatory

221. H.R. REP. NO. 104-204, pt. I, at 72 (1995).
222. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 424 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see also Covad
Comm. Co. v. FCC, 450 F.3d 528, 548 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
223. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Regulatory Enterprise, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 335, 369-70.
224. See, e.g., id. at 369; Joskow & Noll, supra note 181, at 1281-82; Gregory L.
Rosston & Roger G. Noll, The Economics of the Supreme Court’s Decision on Forward
Looking Costs, 1 REV. NETWORK ECON. 81, 88-89 (2002). T. Randolph Beard, George S.
Ford & Lawrence J, Spiwak, Why ADCo? Why Now? An Economic Exploration into the
Future of Industry Structure for the “Last Mile” in Local Telecommunications Markets, 54
FED. COMM. L.J. 421 (2002).
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authorities could dissipate any rents just as effectively simply by setting
retail prices at appropriate levels. Indeed, because wholesale access prices
are typically based on retail prices less any avoided costs, wholesale access
mandates raise all of the problems associated with regulating retail rates,
with the added complication that regulators must also determine the
magnitude of the marketing and operational costs actually avoided.
Wholesale access also has the potential to impair dynamic efficiency.
To have any benefit, wholesale access prices must be set very precisely. If
set too high, the entire wholesale access regime does not constrain the
incumbent and instead simply imposes regulatory costs without providing
any compensating benefits. If set too low, wholesale access destroys
incentives for competitors to invest in their own networks and dampens the
incentives for the incumbent to invest in its own facilities, because any
benefit that it develops would have to be shared at wholesale cost. Indeed,
the incumbent faces a moral hazard problem in that its competitors can
avoid the risks of opening new markets simply by waiting until the
incumbent undertakes the necessary investments and then entering only
those markets that prove profitable.
These difficulties are aptly demonstrated by the two major instances
in which wholesale access has been mandated. Consider first the Rochester
Telephone’s Open Market Plan, which proposed separating its local
telephone network into a separate company that would serve all comers on
a wholesale basis. 225 The New York Public Service Commission (NYPSC)
soon became concerned that the system of structural separation embodied
in the Open Market Plan was unworkable. At the same time, the NYPSC
received repeated requests for decreases in wholesale access prices,
increasing the discount from full retail price from 5% to as much as
19.6%, 226 as well as complaints about delays and difficulties in the process
of ordering service. The wholesale access provisions of the Open Market
Plan were eventually superseded by the 1996 Act and by Global Crossing’s
acquisition of Rochester. During the period the Open Market Plan was in
effect, the NYPSC acknowledged that “competition ha[d] yet to develop to
any noticeable extent.” 227

225. Robert W. Crandall & J. Gregory Sidak, Is Structural Separation of Incumbent
Local Exchange Carriers Necessary for Competition?, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 335, 379-83
(2002).
226. Id. at 381.
227. See Joint Complaint of AT&T Comm. of New York, Inc., MCI Telecomm. Corp.,
WorldCom, Inc. d/b/a LDDS WorldCom and the Empire Ass’n of Long Distance Tele. Cos.,
Inc., No. 95-C-0657, 1998 WL 744059, at *1, *3 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n July 15 1998)
(recognizing that “little competition has developed in the company’s service territory to
date”).
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Studies analyzing the wholesale access provisions of the 1996 Act
have similarly concluded that wholesale access has failed to serve either as
a basis for competition among resellers or as a stepping stone toward
facilities-based competition. 228 In fact, the growth of wholesale access
appears to be correlated with a drop in investment in facilities by both new
entrants and incumbents, a connection largely corroborated in financial
analysts’ reports. 229 Likewise, abandonment of wholesale access was
accompanied by a move toward facilities-based competition through VoIP
and emerging wireless technologies. 230 Indeed, competitors and financial
analysts agreed that wholesale access was uneconomical as a competitive
strategy. 231

C.

Interconnection Access

Interconnection access refers to reciprocal connections between two
networks competing to offer similar services to the same customers as the
network owner. 232 It gives each provider the right to handoff traffic
originating on its own network for termination on the other provider’s
network. It also obligates the provider to terminate traffic originating on the
competitor’s network. These mandated reciprocal connections combine the
two smaller networks to form a larger network.
Interconnection access arises any time two local telephone companies
serve the same calling area. Because of the Bell System’s strategy of either
acquiring competing local systems or ceding the field to those competitors
that refused to merge, Bell-owned local telephone companies rarely
operated in the same calling areas as an independent local telephone
company. It did happen on occasion, such as in the Los Angeles area where
GTE and Pacific Bell both provided local service to different parts of the

228. See, e.g., Hausman & Sidak, supra note 180, at 193-205.
229. See infra note 231.
230. See Hausman & Sidak, supra note 180, at 193-205; Hazlett, supra note 180, at 48586.
231. Almar Latour & Shawn Young, Rules Change Could Alter the Fate of LongDistance Giants, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2004, at B1; AT&T’s Armstrong Says Bells’
Discounts Delay Competition, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Feb. 16, 1998, at 11 (reporting on
AT&T Chairman Michael Armstrong’s speech calling total service resale “fool’s errand”
and noting that AT&T was losing $3 per month per customer offering local service on a
total resale basis); AT&T Targets Local Service, Administrative Costs and Perks in Cost
Cutting, COMM. DAILY, Dec. 22, 1997; MCI Abandons Reselling Residential Local Service
To Focus on Facilities-Based Business Offerings, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Jan. 26, 1998, at
17 (quoting MCI Comm. Corp. President and Chief Operating Officer Timothy F. Price;
resale of residential local exchange services “just doesn’t work”); MCI Says It Will Scrap
Resale Plans In Favor of Facilities-Based Competition, COMM. TODAY, Jan. 23, 1998.
232. For a more complete exposition on interconnection access, see Spulber & Yoo,
Network Regulation, supra note 10, at 641-42, 656-57, 669-70.
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Los Angeles area. 233 As noted earlier, after the emergence of CAPs
providing local telephone service in central business districts, the FCC
mandated interconnection access. The 1996 Act formalized this
requirement by mandating that all incumbents provide interconnection
access. 234
Interconnection access disrupts network management to a much
greater degree than retail and wholesale access. As we noted in our
previous work, the impact of interconnection access on network demand is
ambiguous. 235 On the one hand, by increasing the number of customers that
subscribers can reach, interconnection access causes the value of the
network to increase, which in turn should cause network demand to
increase. On the other hand, the presence of alternative local telephone
networks means that some customers may choose other local telephone
providers, which places downward pressure on network demand. Whether,
on balance, network demand will increase or decrease depends on which of
these two effects dominates.
The possibility that network demand may fall means that network
owners may no longer have sufficient volume to take advantage of costreducing technologies. In addition, in contrast to retail and wholesale
access, which only mandates access at the edges of the network where the
network owner already offers service, interconnection access requires the
creation of new points of entry at major nodes in the middle of the network.
Networks that do not voluntarily offer service at these points will have to
create new interfaces to permit interconnection and to meter service at
these locations. Permitting access at these points also introduces a new
source of flows in the middle of the network, which can have a major
impact on optimal network configuration and may cause congestion in
portions of the network located quite far from the access point. The fact
that traffic now originates and terminates outside of a single network also
increases the cost of obtaining the information necessary for network
planning and creates the possibility of strategic behavior to take advantage
of the information asymmetries.
Some commentators have also warned that incumbent local telephone
companies can use the refusal to provide interconnection access to harm
competition. 236 They argue that in the absence of interconnection, network
233. See Spulber & Yoo, Graph Theory Approach, supra note 9, at 641.
234. 47 U.S.C. §151(a)(1) (2000) (“Each telecommunications carrier has the duty to
interconnect directly or indirectly with the facilities and equipment of other
telecommunications carriers.”).
235. Spulber & Yoo, Network Regulation, supra note 10, at 656-57.
236. See Nicholas Economides et al., Regulatory Pricing Rules to Neutralize Network
Dominance, 5 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 1013 (1996); Faulhaber, supra note 112, at 495-506;
Eli M. Noam, Will Universal Service and Common Carriage Survive the
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economic effects will lead customers to flock to the largest network. Once
the market reaches its tipping point, the value of the network belonging to
the dominant player will so far outstrip that of its competitors that the
market collapses into a natural monopoly. Once tipped, the difficulties that
new entrants face in generating sufficient volume to “un-tip” the market
can cause the resulting monopoly to become locked-in.
The analysis is not quite so simple, however. Because so much of the
literature focuses on the potentially anticompetitive consequences of
network economic effects, it is often overlooked that network economic
effects also provide powerful incentives in favor of interconnection. 237 As
noted earlier, in a market with a sufficient number of equally-sized players,
any player that refused to interconnect would put itself at a tremendous
competitive disadvantage. 238 As also noted above, this conclusion is
reflected in the FCC’s current policy toward interconnection access in the
wireless industry, in which it concluded that the presence of multiple
equally sized providers provided sufficient incentive to ensure
interconnection access even in the absence of regulation. 239
Furthermore, refusal to interconnect is less likely to harm competition
in markets undergoing rapid growth because the primary focus in such
markets is the acquisition of new users. 240 The only scenario in which
equally sized players have an incentive not to interconnect is when two
equally sized firms engage in a race for the market. Interestingly though,
this type of competition does not lead to the delays in technology adoption
and supracompetitive returns associated with refusals to interconnect by
dominant firms. 241 It also has the virtue of promoting the rapid build-out of
new network technologies. Indeed, this appears to be precisely the type of
competition that ensued during the early competitive era of local telephone
service between 1896 and 1907 described above, during which time
mandating interconnection would only serve to slow the build-out of the
network. Once the telephone industry had used mergers and division of
markets to eliminate competition in local telephony, individual companies
no longer had any incentive not to interconnect because telephone

Telecommunications Act of 1996?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 955, 973-74 (1997); Shelanski, supra
note 23, at 99-100.
237. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, J.
ECON. PERSP. Spring 1994, at 93, 105 (noting that “[i]n markets with network effects, there
is natural tendency toward de facto standardization”).
238. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
241. Besen & Farrell, supra note 107, at 122-24.
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companies with nonoverlapping local service monopolies have every
incentive to interconnect with one another. 242
Mandating interconnection access necessarily requires regulatory
authorities to establish access prices. The 1996 Act requires local carriers
to interconnect and to settle the charges through a system of mutual and
reciprocal compensation, 243 which the statute provided would be based on
“a reasonable approximation of the additional costs of terminating such
calls.” 244 The FCC determined that reciprocal compensation rates would be
based on TELRIC. 245
As we have discussed in our earlier work, any approach that bases
prices on the cost of particular network components in essence treats each
component as if it existed in isolation. 246 In so doing, these approaches fail
to capture networks’ defining characteristic, i.e., that they are complex
systems in which the value of any one component depends on its
relationship with and the flows carried by the rest of the network. One of
TELRIC’s central failings is its inability to take the network’s
configuration into account.
The problem of determining rates is made all the worse by mandating
interconnection “at any technically feasible point.” 247 This requirement
prevents the network owner from minimizing the adverse impact to its
system by choosing which facilities to employ when fulfilling any
particular request for service. In the worst case scenario, the right to
designate the point of interconnection gives competitors the opportunity to
act strategically by basing their access requests not on their needs, but
rather on what would inflict the greatest harm on the network owner. A
network owner may wish to hedge against this possibility by maintaining
excess capacity in case one of its competitors decides to request access to a
key portion of its network. This has the drawback of forcing the network
owner to make capital investments that may never be used. Indeed,
competitors that are acting strategically may well take into account whether
the network owner maintains such excess capacity when deciding whether
and where to request access. If so, the mere fact that the network owner has
added excess capacity to hedge against the possibility of a strategic access
request effectively guarantees that access will be sought elsewhere.
The emergence of local telephone competition has begun to provide
market benchmarks that can obviate the need to establish interconnection
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Spulber & Yoo, Mandating Access, supra note 193, at 1892-96.
47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(5) (2000).
See id. § 252(d)(2)(A)(ii).
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
Spulber & Yoo, Graph Theory Approach, supra note 9 at 1709-13.
47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)(B).
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access rates through regulation. 248 As noted earlier, wireless telephone
services have successfully emerged as direct competitors to wireline
telephony. The emergence of the wireless industry is important because
wireless-to-wireless interconnection is currently unregulated. 249 As a result,
the terms of interconnection between wireless carriers are determined
through arms-length negotiations that can provide precisely the type of
external benchmark needed to determine the market value of transport and
call termination services. Admittedly, interconnection between wireless
carriers does involve somewhat different considerations than
interconnection with incumbent LECs. Direct comparisons are complicated
by the significant differences in utilization rates as well as the emergence
of wireless pricing schemes that do not differentiate between local and
long-distance service. The analysis is further obscured by the fact that such
interconnection between wireless carriers is often accomplished indirectly
through the LECs. 250 Still, as wireless and other facilities-based
competitors grow, rates charged for interconnection between wireless
competitors will continue to emerge as a market-based reference point that
can be used to resolve most pricing problems. The number of external
benchmarks will only continue to grow as local cable operators and other
types of broadband providers begin to offer local telephone service.
In the absence of external benchmarks based on actual market
transactions, resort to some cost-based, second-best measure of market
value becomes necessary. As noted earlier, economic theory suggests that
cost-based measures should include the foregone benefits that the network
owner could have enjoyed had it not been required to devote a portion of its
network element to its competitor. One example is the Efficient Component
Pricing Rule (ECPR), which sets rates as the sum of the direct incremental
costs of providing an input and the opportunity costs that the incumbent
incurs when the new entrant provides the services instead of the
incumbent. 251 The TELRIC methodology incorporates the first of these two
248. The discussion that follows is based on Spulber & Yoo, Access to Networks, supra
note 30, at 971-75.
249. CMRS Interconnection Order, supra note 113, at 13534 para. 28. For an overview
of the early history of these somewhat protracted proceedings, see HUBER, KELLOGG &
THORNE, supra note 2, § 10.5.3.
250. CMRS Interconnection Order, supra note 113, at 13533-34 paras. 26-27.
Historically, such comparisons were further complicated by the FCC’s decision to award
one of the two available first generation cellular licenses to the incumbent LEC, which in
turn produced reasons to question whether in fact interconnection agreements between
wireless carriers in fact represented arms-length transactions. The deployment of
competitive wireless networks on a national scale, the subsequent emergence of PCS, and
the impending arrival of third generation wireless devices should eliminate this problem in
the near future—if it has not done so already.
251. One of the authors of this piece has elsewhere advanced the argument that, in
addition to ECPR, the rates charged for access to unbundled network elements should also
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components. Unfortunately, it does not include any factor to reflect the
network owner’s opportunity cost. In so doing, TELRIC in essence
contradicts the insights of neoclassical economics by basing value solely on
supply-side concerns without taking demand-side effects into
consideration. As such, TELRIC is fundamentally inconsistent with the
analysis of markets that serves as the foundation for all modern economic
theory. 252
Although the FCC considered and rejected arguments that it should
base access rates on ECPR, its reasons for doing so do not withstand
analysis. The first reason was that the FCC believed that the statutory
requirement that prices be based on “cost” precluded it from considering
opportunity cost. 253 The Verizon Court specifically rejected this reasoning
when it found the term, “cost,” to be “too protean” to support any such
plain language argument. 254 If anything, the FCC’s argument is directly
undercut by the fact that it is now an economic truism that opportunity
costs represent a true economic cost borne by the incumbent LEC. 255
Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized as much when it cited “opportunity
cost” as an example of a forward-looking “cost” that fell within the
purview of the statute. 256
The FCC’s second reason for rejecting ECPR is equally misplaced.
The FCC asserted that because ECPR calculates opportunity cost based on
current retail prices, it locks in supracompetitive returns without providing
a mechanism for moving prices towards competitive levels. 257 The FCC’s
reasoning overlooks the fact that the emergence of competition will cause
retail prices to drop as well. Furthermore, any monopoly rents that may be
present in retail prices are more properly regarded as the result of the
include a non-by-passable end-user charge to compensate incumbent LECs for costs
stranded by deregulatory innovations that caused investment-backed expectations to fail.
See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 194, at 334-35. Extended discussion of these issues fall
outside the scope of this Article. For the time being, it suffices to point out that the argument
advanced in this Article, while consistent with the imposition of such user charges, does not
require it.
252. See Christopher S. Yoo, New Models of Regulation and Interagency Governance,
2003 MICH. ST. DCL L. REV. 701, 712-13.
253. Local Competition Order, supra note 50, at 15859 para. 709.
254. Verizon Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 501 (2002). In the same opinion, the
court also noted that the term “cost” is “a chameleon” and called it a “virtually meaningless
term” that “say[s] little about the method employed to determine a particular rate.” Id. at
500-01 (internal quotations omitted).
255. See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 194, at 322-23, 404-10.
256. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 499 n.17.
257. Local Competition Order, supra note 50, at 15859 para. 709; see also Special
Access Order, supra note 42, at 7426 para. 123, 7430 para. 129 (rejecting the use of “net
revenue” test proposed by Alfred Kahn in setting interconnection rates in the FCC’s Special
Access Order proceeding).

Number 1]

A UNIFIED ACCESS THEORY

97

failure of the methodology for implementing retail access than a flaw in
taking opportunity cost into consideration when setting wholesale rates.
These concerns may well justify reconsidering the approach for setting
retail rates. They do not justify distorting wholesale rates, such as
interconnection access prices, by failing to include some means for taking
demand-side determinants of value into account.258
Although the Supreme Court upheld the FCC’s ratemaking
methodology in Verizon, it would be a mistake to construe the Court’s
action as a specific endorsement of TELRIC and a rejection of ECPR as a
matter of economic policy. The Court was quite careful to reserve
judgment over the relative merits of any particular economic approach to
setting access rates. Instead, the Court based its decision on the deferential
standard of review that gave agencies broad latitude to resolve any
interpretive ambiguities that exist in the statutes that they administer by
upholding any proffered construction of the statute so long as it is
reasonable. 259 It would thus be a mistake to read the Court’s decision as
foreclosing the adoption of a ratemaking approach based on market prices
or ECPR in the future.
More fundamentally, even policymakers reluctant to embrace ECPR
can appreciate the importance of modeling network behavior at the
systemic level. In fact, the graph theoretical approach that we propose can
improve telecommunications policy regardless of the particular ratemaking
methodology employed.
Regulators are also experimenting with alternative institutional
arrangements that obviate the need to set access rates altogether. 260 The
statute made clear that it did not preclude arrangements that waive mutual
recovery, such as bill and keep. 261 Indeed, local telephone companies
serving the same area, such as Pacific Bell and GTE, have long exchanged

258. See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 194, at 351-58, 362-63.
259. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 497-522. The Court noted that “[a]s a reviewing Court we are,
of course, in no position to assess the precise economic significance of [various economic
aspects of the incumbent LECs’ arguments]. Instead, it is enough to recognize that the
incumbents’ assumption may well be incorrect.” Id. at 507. The Court also noted, “[w]e
cannot say whether the passage of time will show competition prompted by TELRIC to be
an illusion, but TELRIC appears to be a reasonable policy for now, and that is all that
counts.” Id. at 523. See also, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 426 (1999)
(Breyer, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (noting that in rejecting ECPR, the FCC
“did not claim, nor did its reasoning support the claim, that the use of such a system would
be arbitrary or unreasonable”).
260. Yoo, Economics of Congestion, supra note 81, at 1866-72; and Christopher S. Yoo,
What Can Antitrust Contribute to the Network Neutrality Debate?, 1 INT’L J. COMM. 493,
517-21 (2007).
261. See 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(2)(B)(i) (2000).
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traffic on a bill and keep basis. 262 The rationale is that the payments one
network would receive for terminating traffic from the other network
would be largely offset by the payments that network would have to pay for
traffic passing in the opposite direction. Whatever slight differences in
traffic would not justify incurring the transaction costs needed to account
for and bill the interchange of traffic.
The FCC recognized the potential benefits from such alternative
institutional arrangements in its initial order implementing the 1996 Act. 263
The emergence of competition in local telephone services made it
inevitable that some calls would originate on one company’s local
telephone network and terminate on another’s. Although both the
originating and terminating carrier would incur costs, the fact that local
telephone service in the United States operates on a “calling party pays”
basis, only the originating carrier would receive any payment for the call.
The 1996 Act established a system of “reciprocal compensation” to
compensate the terminating carrier for its costs through which originating
carriers could compensate other carriers for the costs of terminating calls
originating on other carriers. 264 The statute requires that reciprocal
compensation be based on a reasonable approximation of the costs incurred
by each carrier. At the same time, the statute specifically leaves open the
possibility of bill and keep arrangements, in which each carrier retains the
revenue it receives from its own customers without making any additional
payments to the other carriers. 265
The FCC’s initial order implementing the 1996 Act expressed
skepticism about bill and keep, largely out of concern that bill and keep
might give originating carriers both the ability and the incentive to impose
costs onto terminating carriers. For this reason, the FCC concluded that bill
and keep regimes were generally “not economically efficient.”266
That said, the FCC recognizes that circumstances exist under which
bill and keep may be economically beneficial. 267 If the traffic traveling in
each direction is roughly balanced, any payments made by one carrier to
the other would simply be offset by similarly sized payments passing in the
other direction. If so, bill and keep would not create any economic harms
while at the same time relieving carriers of the administrative burdens and

262. See Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 9610, 9634-37 paras. 69-77 (2002).
263. Local Competition Order, supra note 50, at 16055 para. 1112.
264. 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(5).
265. See id. § 252(d)(2)(A)-(B).
266. Local Competition Order, supra note 50, at 16055 para. 1112.
267. Id.
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transaction costs needed to create and implement systems to meter the
traffic passing in each direction. 268
Indeed, bill and keep may be economically efficient even when the
traffic exchanged between carriers is not symmetrical. The point is most
easily understood through the following example.
Suppose that two local networks operate in the same area, with the
incumbent carrier serving ninety customers and the new entrant serving ten
customers. Each customer makes ten calls randomly distributed throughout
the entire customer base. One would expect the customers of the dominant
carrier to initiate 900 calls. Ninety percent (or 810) of those calls would
terminate on the incumbent’s network, while ten percent (ninety) would
terminate on the new entrant’s network. At the same time, one would
expect the new entrant’s customers to place one hundred calls, ten percent
(ten) of which would terminate on the new entrant’s network and ninety
percent (ninety) of which would terminate on the dominant carrier’s
network. Thus, if originations and termination are symmetric and randomly
distributed, ninety calls would pass from the incumbent’s network to the
new entrant’s network, and the same number of calls would pass in the
other direction. Under these circumstances, metering actual usage would
provide no economic benefits even though the total traffic handled by each
network would be far from balanced.
As noted above, GTE and Pacific Bell interconnected on a bill and
keep basis when serving adjacent neighborhoods in Los Angeles despite
the fact that the size of their customer bases was far from symmetrical. 269
The implication is that the transaction cost economies associated with
avoiding metering costs outweighed what little benefit would have resulted
from a more accurate accounting of the actual traffic flows. Note that a far
different situation holds if one carrier’s customers disproportionately make
calls that terminated on the other carrier’s network. In addition, the
symmetry of terminations and originations does not hold if one carrier only
terminates calls, as would occur for carriers providing service to paging
service providers, call centers, or Internet service providers. In those cases,
the resulting asymmetry on a calling party system would lead to substantial
distortions. 270
Economic theory has identified one way in which even last-mile
providers without market power in the national market can nonetheless use
their terminating access monopoly to harm competition. 271 This market
268.
269.
270.
271.

Id.
See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
Local Competition Order, supra note 50, at 16043 para. 1092.
See ROBERT CRANDALL & LEONARD WAVERMAN, TALK IS CHEAP: THE PROMISE OF
REGULATORY REFORM IN NORTH AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 265-66 (1995), JEAN-
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failure results from what is in essence a common pool problem stemming
from the fact that the United States follows the practice that the calling
party pays the long-distance carrier for the entirety of the long-distance
call. Long-distance carriers are, of course, not the only carriers that incur
costs when a customer places a long-distance call. The LEC for the party
originating the call must incur costs to provide a connection between the
customer’s premises and the long-distance carrier’s point of presence in the
originating LEC’s central office. Furthermore, the terminating LEC must
also incur the cost of connecting the call from its central office to the
customer premises of the party to whom the call is placed. Long-distance
carriers compensate originating and terminating LECs through a series of
federally mandated access charges, which under current law must be
uniform across all carriers and all customers. 272 In other words, the cost of
terminating access is covered by requiring customers to make uniform
contributions to a common pool.
The key question is what impact the deregulation of access charges
would have on originating and terminating LECs’ pricing behavior. The
FCC has concluded that the possibility that the originating carrier might
charge excessive access charges is effectively limited by the fact that the
calling party chooses its local service provider, decides whether to place
the call, and ultimately bears the cost of the call. 273 The calling party, either
directly or indirectly through its long-distance carrier, is thus well situated
to exert price discipline over originating access charges. The same is not
true, however, for terminating access charges. Because neither the calling
party nor its long-distance carrier has any influence over the called party’s
choice of LEC; neither can exert any price discipline over terminating
access charges. Furthermore, the common pool aspect of the access charge
regime means that LEC customers will not bear the full brunt of any
increase in terminating access charges. Instead, the impact of the higher
prices will be spread over the entire universe of local telephone subscribers.
This, in turn, gives terminating LECs both the ability and the incentive to
raise terminating access charges above competitive levels in order to draw
a disproportionate amount of compensation out of the common pool. The
impetus to increase terminating access charges exists regardless of whether
competition in local access exists or the terminating LEC is small. Indeed,
small carriers may well have the greatest incentive to increase terminating
JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 182-87 (2000).
The terminating access monopoly problem is succinctly summarized in Access Charge
Reform, Fifth Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 F.C.C.R.
14221, 14313-14 para. 181 (1999) [hereinafter Pricing Flexibility Order].
272. Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime, Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 4685, 4688-91 paras. 6-11 (2005).
273. Pricing Flexibility Order, supra note 271, at 14314 para. 181.
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access charges because the percentage of the increase to their own
customers will be disproportionately small. At the same time, such pricing
behavior might give long-distance carriers greater incentive to enter the
local access market in order to avoid paying these charges.
A number of mechanisms exist to solve this problem without
mandating interconnection. For example, the incentive to increase
terminating access charges would disappear if the FCC were to mandate
bill and keep. Indeed, any uniform access pricing regime would eliminate
the ability for terminating LECs to take advantage of the common pool
problem, although economic efficiency would ultimately depend on
ensuring that access prices are set at competitive levels. In addition, LECs’
incentive to increase terminating access charges could also be eliminated
by mandating that terminating access charges be reciprocal, although
reciprocity may have implications for entry. 274 Reciprocity is not as
effective when LECs do not originate and terminate traffic in a roughly
symmetrical manner, as illustrated by disputes over carriers that only serve
customers that receive calls, such as Internet service providers, conference
call companies, and chat rooms, as evidenced by the recent dispute over
“traffic-pumping.” 275 Finally, the terminating access charges used by the
incumbent LEC with which the new entrant competes can be used as a
benchmark for determining the reasonableness of the new entrant’s
terminating access charges. 276 A complete resolution of this issue exceeds
the scope of this Article. For our purposes, determining which of these
different mechanisms would best promote consumer welfare is less
important than the fact that institutional mechanisms may exist for solving
the terminating access problem that do not require imposing an access
mandate.

274. Jean-Jacques Laffont, Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, Competition Between
Telecommunications Operators, 41 EUR. ECON. REV. 701 (1997); Jean-Jacques Laffont,
Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, Network Competition: I. Overview and Nondiscriminatory
Pricing, 29 RAND J. ECON. 1, 8-12 (1998).
275. This dispute arose when a small group of rural Iowa LECs left the uniform tariffs
established by the National Exchange Carrier Association and negotiated relatively high
compensation rates designed to cover their costs at their historically low volumes. After
establishing these rates, these LECs began to solicit customers offering services that only
terminate calls, such as conference calling or free adult chat-line services. These customers
then advertise their conference calling and chat-line services on the Internet as free services.
The result, in one case, was for the terminating traffic of 175 customers to jump from
15,000 minutes to 6.4 million minutes in a five-month span, resulting in a transfer payment
of $10 million to $15 million to these small LECs. See Virgil Larson, Big Phone Carriers
Say Small Firms Bleed Them, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, May 16, 2007, at 1D.
276. See Access Charge Reform, Seventh Report and Order and Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 9923, 9941-50 paras. 45-63 (2001); Noel D. Uri,
Monopoly Power and the Problem of CLEC Access Charges, 25 TELECOMM. POL’Y 611,
621 (2001).
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Platform Access

Platform represents the type of access most often granted through
regulation. Platform access occurs when the government mandates that a
network owner provide nondiscriminatory access to providers of
complementary services. Implementation of platform access requires the
creation of a standard and the nondiscriminatory provision of network
service to anyone presenting data configured in accordance with that
standard. 277 For example, the FCC’s Part 68 Rules, 278 which can be traced
to the FCC’s landmark decision in Carterfone, 279 have long required the
Bell System to open its local telephone networks to all providers of CPE.
As a result of MCI’s long battle with AT&T, the FCC has also required the
Bell System to open its local telephone network to all providers of longdistance services. 280 Furthermore, the FCC’s Computer Inquiries required
local telephone companies to open their networks to all providers of
information services. 281 Similar mandates were included in the consent
decree breaking up AT&T and the related consent decree regarding
GTE. 282 In each case, this regulation is properly regarded as platform
access because it involves opening up the network to providers of
complementary services.
The 1996 Act essentially left this system undisturbed. With respect to
long distance, § 251(c)(2) requires all carriers providing local telephone
service to provide interconnection to any carrier for the transmission and
routing of long-distance access that is equal in quality to the
interconnection the local telephone company provides to itself on rates,
terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.283
The FCC construed this provision to apply only to the physical linking of
the two networks and not for the charges for transporting and terminating
long-distance traffic. 284 Indeed, as the Eighth Circuit reasoned in upholding
the FCC’s decision, § 251(g) specifies that the preexisting equal access and
interconnection requirements would remain in place until specifically

277. For a more complete exposition on platform access, see Spulber & Yoo, Network
Regulation, supra note 10, at 643-45, 657-58, 670-71.
278. 47 C.F.R. pt. 68 (2008).
279. Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, Decision, 13
F.C.C.2d 420 (1968).
280. See, e.g., MTS and WATS Market Structure, Phase III, Report and Order, 100
F.C.C.2d 860 (1985).
281. See supra note 24-35, and accompanying text.
282. Spulber & Yoo, Mandating Access, supra note 193, at 1901-02.
283. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2) (2000).
284. Local Competition Order, supra note 50, at 15590 para. 176.
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superseded by the FCC. 285 Because the advent of competition would put
pressure on any cross-subsidies embedded in access charges, the FCC
initiated an access charge proceeding designed to make transport pricing
entirely cost-based. 286
The 1996 Act similarly left undisturbed the mandate that local
telephone companies must provide equal access to information service
providers. 287 It augmented those requirements with a number of other
provisions, including requiring incumbents to allow information service
providers to resell local telephone services at wholesale rates and to
provide unbundled access to key elements of their networks. 288 The FCC
continued to regard information service providers as customers of the local
telephone network rather than as long-distance providers that had to pay
access charges. 289 Concerns about preserving platform access also underlay
the statutory provisions in the 1996 Act prohibiting the former BOCs from
offering long-distance service, information services, and alarm
monitoring. 290 The idea was that, until competition emerged in local
telephone service, these firms would have the incentive to discriminate
against nonproprietary, complementary service offerings.
Providing greater accessibility to complementary services and
reducing the business risk faced by providers of those services should cause
network demand to increase. 291 At the same time, platform access
inevitably involves a number of collateral requirements that can become
sources of inefficiency and place downward pressure on network demand.
For example, local telephone networks give rise to certain technological
efficiencies that can only be realized if the same carrier provides both the
complementary and the local telephone service. Classic examples include
voice messaging services, such as voice mail and advance calling, and
vertical switching services, such as caller ID, call forwarding, and call
waiting, which are most efficiently provided when integrated directly into
the circuit switch. 292 The FCC eventually exempted such innovations from

285. Competitive Telecomms. Ass’n v. FCC (CompTel), 117 F.3d 1068, 1071-73 (8th
Cir. 1997) (discussing 47 U.S.C. § 251(g)).
286. Access Charge Reform, First Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 15982 (1997)
[hereinafter Access Charge Reform Order].
287. Computer III Further Remand Proceeding: Bell Operating Company Provision of
Enhanced Services, Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R. 6040, 6054 para.
20 (1998).
288. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(4).
289. Access Charge Reform Order, supra note 286, at 16133 para. 344.
290. §§ 271, 274-275.
291. Spulber & Yoo, Network Regulation, supra note 10, at 657.
292. See Computer III Phase I Order, supra note 32, at 971-73 paras. 17-19, 1109-14
paras. 307-17.
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its platform access requirements for the simple reason that failure to do so
would have prevented these innovations from emerging. 293
Platform access also necessarily requires regulators to designate the
location within the network to interface with complementary service
providers, as well as the format in which the complementary service is
configured. The optimal level of standardization depends largely on the
magnitude of the demand-side scale economies and the heterogeneity of
consumer preferences. If preferences are sufficiently heterogeneous, the
value that consumers derive from consuming a service that is a better
match with their preferences will dominate the benefits from belonging to a
larger network, in which case an equilibrium with multiple standards may
well be optimal.
Standardization also inevitably favors applications based on certain
architectures. For example, the introduction of digital transmission
technologies required the deployment of protocols that were not
interoperable with the existing analog network. This necessitated the
introduction of computer processing into the core of the network to engage
in “protocol conversion.” 294 Absent a waiver from the platform access
mandate, the interoperability mandated by the Computer Inquiries would
have obstructed this innovation from being deployed. 295 It is impossible to
conclude a priori that standardizing on single network architecture
represents the optimal solution. The process is rendered even more
challenging if the technology is undergoing rapid change. Under the best of
circumstances, regulation will lock the existing interface into place at least
until the regulatory process can update it. At worst, such technological
decisions will be affected by the biases inherent in regulatory processes, in
which the concerns of the incumbents tend to be overrepresented.
The standardization implicit in platform access also commoditizes
network services and narrows the dimensions along which local telephone
networks can compete. Product standardization and price transparency
make both collusive and noncooperative oligopolistic behavior easier to
maintain. Commoditization also limits networks to competing solely based
on price and network size, considerations that reinforce the advantages
293. See, e.g. Non-Accounting Safeguards Order, supra note 127, at 21955-58 paras.
100-05; Computer III Phase I Order, supra note 32, at 1100-09 paras. 289-306, 1112-14
paras. 313-17; AT&T Waiver Petition, supra note 127; Protocol Waiver Order, supra note
127.
294. See, e.g., Computer III Phase I Order, supra note 32, at 979-80 paras. 33-34;
Protocol Waiver Order, supra note 127; AT&T Waiver Petition, supra note 127; Protocols
Order, supra note 127, at 594-95 paras. 22-25.
295. See, e.g. Non-Accounting Safeguards Order, supra note 127, at 21955-58 paras.
100-05; Computer III Phase I Order, supra note 32, at 1100-09 paras. 289-306, 1112-14
paras. 313-17; AT&T Waiver Petition, supra note 127; Protocol Waiver Order, supra note
127, at 1060 para. 5.
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enjoyed by the largest players. Differentiation can play a particularly
important role in industries like telecommunications, in which the presence
of fixed costs that are large relative to marginal costs, forces network
providers to produce on the declining portion of the average cost curve. As
Edward Chamberlin pointed out in his classic work on monopolistic
competition, product differentiation can create stable equilibriums with
multiple producers each producing on the declining portion of the average
cost curve. 296 Thus, smaller players can survive despite cost and size
disadvantages by targeting subsegments of the market.
Platform access also gives rise to significant transaction costs, both in
terms of establishing the governing standards and in terms of establishing
the interface. This includes putting into place processes at those interfaces
for monitoring and billing the service provided to existing customers and
for provisioning service to new customers. As Justice Breyer has noted,
such an interface is likely to be particularly burdensome to police when the
interface is complex and embedded in the middle of the network and when
the information requirements needed to regulate the interface are high.297
The breakup of AT&T provides a useful example. Implementing the
divestiture decree’s equal access mandate required the local telephone
companies to redesign their switches so that they could accommodate
multiple long-distance providers—a process that entailed considerable cost
and delay, as well as close regulation of both the price and nonprice terms
and conditions of interconnection. Such oversight is particularly onerous
when the interface and the information requirements needed to implement
it are complex. 298 Furthermore, like any form of access, platform access
requires direct regulation of prices in order to be effective, both in terms of
nondiscrimination and in terms of price levels. There is thus little reason to
be optimistic that such regulation will prove beneficial.
Most problematic is platform access’s long-run impact on dynamic
efficiency. As noted earlier, the primary policy goal should be to promote
entry in those segments of the industry that are the least competitive. Only
if competition in a particular segment proves unsustainable should
policymakers pursue the second-best policy goal of promoting competition
in complementary services. Once local telephone competition became
possible, platform access became counterproductive. Providers of
complementary services were the natural strategic partners for new entrants
in local telephone service. Platform access short-circuited this natural
296. EDWARD HASTINGS CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION: OF
RE-ORIENTATION OF THE THEORY OF VALUE 27-33, 50-51, 194-95 (8th ed. 1962).
297. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 428-29 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
298. Gerald R. Faulhaber, Policy-Induced Competition: The Telecommunications
Experiments, 15 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 73, 77, 81, 82-84 (2003).
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alliance by obviating the need for any complementary service providers to
enter into such partnerships.
At the time most of the platform access mandates discussed above
were put into place, competition in local telephone service was believed to
be impossible. The FCC recognized, when eliminating the regulatory
requirements imposed by the Computer Inquiries, that those rules “were
developed before separate and different broadband technologies began to
emerge and compete for the same customers” and could no longer be
justified under contemporary circumstances. 299 In short, it is now clear that
wireline competition is feasible with respect to large business customers
and that wireless telephony has emerged as a vibrant competitor as well.
Lastly, network owners have powerful incentives to provide platform
access voluntarily. 300 The economic consensus is that competition among
local telephone providers is sufficient to prevent those providers from
engaging in anticompetitive behavior against providers of complementary
services. Even if the local telephone market is not competitive, moreover,
network owners are still likely to provide platform access voluntarily
because opening networks to the broadest possible array of complementary
services typically represents the best way for a carrier to maximize the
value of its local telephone network. Although economic theorists have
identified a narrow set of circumstances under which that would not be
true, those exceptions are fairly narrow and require the satisfaction of fairly
restrictive conditions.
Unfortunately, policymakers have been loathe to take wireless
competition into account when deciding whether to release local telephone
companies from platform access mandates. For example, the legislative
history of the 1996 Act indicated that competition from cellular telephone
companies should not be considered when determining whether an
incumbent local telephone company faced sufficient competition to justify
releasing it from the prohibition on offering long-distance services. 301 The
299. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853,
14876-77 para. 42 (2005) [hereinafter Wireline Broadband Order].
300. Yoo, Vertical Integration, supra note 93, at 187-202. 253-67; Spulber & Yoo,
Mandating Access, supra note 193, at 1898-99. See also Besen & Farrell, supra note 107, at
117 (“A firm’s strategy toward vertically related firms—the suppliers of complementary
goods—normally involves trying to encourage a generous supply of complements, while
perhaps also trying to discourage the supply of complements to rivals.”); Joseph Farrell &
Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a
Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 104
(2003) (“[T]he platform monopolist has an incentive to be a good steward of the
applications sector for its platform.”).
301. H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 147 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (noting that neither cellular
service nor resale of a BOC’s local exchange services would satisfy the statutory “facilitiesbased competitor requirement”).
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FCC would later retreat from this position and acknowledge wireless as a
direct competitor to wireline local telephone service after the deployment
of PCS. 302
Over time, policymakers have narrowed the scope of local telephone
networks’ platform access obligations. With respect to long-distance
service, the FCC has ruled that the local telephone companies created by
the breakup of AT&T now face sufficient competition to justify permitting
them to offer in-region long-distance service in every state except Alaska
and Hawaii. 303 As discussed in greater detail elsewhere, the dissipation of
the need for platform access to preserve long-distance competition is
demonstrated most eloquently by the regulatory authorities’ approval of
SBC’s acquisition of AT&T and Verizon’s acquisition of MCI, which
reconsolidated local and long-distance services. 304
In addition, the FCC has eliminated the platform access for
information services. As the FCC recognized when eliminating the
regulatory requirements imposed by the Computer Inquiries, those rules
“were developed before separate and different broadband technologies
began to emerge and compete for the same customers” and could no longer
be justified under contemporary circumstances. 305
Lastly, the FCC has acknowledged that the increase in competition
has weakened the ability of last-mile providers to discriminate in favor of
proprietary CPE. For example, in 1992 the FCC abolished the prohibition
on bundling CPE with wireless telephone services. 306 The FCC issued this
order at a fairly early stage in the wireless industry’s development when the
evidence of the competitiveness of the wireless industry was
“inconclusive.” 307 As noted earlier, the FCC initially established the
wireless industry in 1981 through a duopoly market structure and had not
yet begun to auction PCS licenses. The FCC nonetheless found the
possibility that some cellular providers might possess a degree of local
market power insufficient to justify prohibiting the bundling of CPE with
wireless telephone service because any one cellular provider represented a
tiny fraction of the national equipment market. 308 Any CPE manufacturer
302. See, supra note 132 and accompanying text.
303. FCC, BOC AUTHORIZATIONS TO PROVIDE IN-REGION INTERLATA SERVICES UNDER
SECTIONS 271 AND 272, supra note 132 (reporting that the FCC has ruled that local
telephone companies are subject to sufficient competition to permit them to offer in-region
long-distance service in every state except Alaska and Hawaii).
304. See Spulber & Yoo, Mandating Access, supra note 193, at 1903.
305. Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 299, at 14876-77 para. 42.
306. Bundling of Cellular Customer Premises Equipment and Cellular Service, Report
and Order, 7 F.C.C.R. 4028 (1992).
307. Id. at 4031-32 para. 27.
308. Id. at 4028-29 para. 7, 4029-30 paras. 13-18.
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foreclosed from distributing its products in one geographic area remained
free to sell its products in other areas. As the Federal Trade Commission’s
comments during this proceeding note, “‘[i]f individual cellular service
companies do not possess market power in the sale of cellular service on a
national level, it is unlikely that foreclosure of the CPE market can be
successful.’” 309 The FCC agreed, concluding that “it does not seem likely
that individual cellular companies which operate in local markets possess
market power that could impact the numerous CPE manufacturers
operating on a national and international basis.” 310 The proper question is
thus, not the number of subscribers that a network controls in any one
metropolitan area, but rather the network’s market share in the national
market. In short, it is national reach, not local reach, that matters. The FCC
found that not only is bundling an efficient way to distribute CPE, “the
high price of CPE represented the greatest barrier to inducing subscription
to cellular service.” 311 Bundling wireless service with CPE allows wireless
carriers to reduce the up-front cost of subscribing to cellular, which in turn
will support greater competition and promote more efficient use of the
spectrum. 312
Similarly, the FCC concluded in 2001 that the growth in competition
among local exchange carriers justified abolishing its prohibition of
bundling CPE with wireline telecommunications services. 313 Even though
local exchange markets were not yet perfectly competitive, the FCC
concluded that the growth of local competition and the consumer benefits
of bundling—such as the reduction of transaction costs and increase in
innovation in services—sufficiently mitigated the risk of anticompetitive
harm. 314 The FCC has also abandoned its previous role in establishing the
technical criteria for interconnecting CPE, although the FCC stopped short
of repealing the interconnection requirements altogether. 315

E.

Unbundled Access

Unbundled access is a right given to competitors using individual
components of the incumbent’s network. 316 Local telephone networks have
309. Id. at 4029-30 para. 13 (emphasis added).
310. Id.
311. Id. at 4030-31 para. 19.
312. Id.
313. Policy and Rules Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace, Report and
Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 7418, 7424 para. 10 (2001).
314. Id. at 7424 para. 10, 7436-37 paras. 30-31, 7438-40 paras. 33-36.
315. 2000 Biennial Reg. Review of Part 68 of the Comm’n’s Rules and Regs., Report
and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 24944, paras. 16-17, 24951-53 paras. 20-23 (2000).
316. For a more complete exposition on unbundled access, see Spulber & Yoo, Network
Regulation, supra note 10, at 645-46, 658-60, 671-73.
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long represented one of the central laboratories in which regulatory
authorities have experimented with unbundled access as a way to guard
against vertical exclusion without foreclosing the benefits of vertical
integration. As discussed above, the open network architecture regime
created by Computer Inquiry III represents perhaps the seminal example of
FCC-mandated unbundling. 317 The UNE access provision enacted by
Congress constitutes perhaps the most important provision of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, with UNE access prices being based on
TELRIC. 318 Other important antecedents include state unbundling
initiatives between 1984 and 1996, as well as the unbundling model
developed by the U.S. Department of Justice in negotiations to allow
Ameritech to begin selling in-region long-distance services. 319
Unbundled access is the form of access that has the greatest potential
to cause economic inefficiency. Like wholesale and interconnection access,
the fact that unbundled access simultaneously supports the creation of new
services and diverts traffic off of the network renders the impact of
unbundled access on network demand ambiguous. Both increases and
decreases in network demand change the optimal network configuration,
either by making the creation of links in particular locations or costreducing, traffic-aggregating technologies economically feasible or
infeasible.
At the same time, unbundled access disrupts network management to
a far greater degree than other forms of access. Unlike the other forms of
access, which generally introduce traffic at the major nodes where
customers or providers of complementary services would naturally
interconnect with the network, unbundled access can introduce traffic deep
within the heart of the network. Unbundled access has the potential to
occupy isolated resources at multiple, disconnected points in the network.
In contrast, other forms of access involve large, integrated portions of the
network to route traffic in patterns that are roughly similar to the traffic
served by the network owner.
As we described elsewhere, graph theory reveals how occupying
isolated resources in one part of the network can adversely affect the
performance of portions of the network located far from the element being
accessed. 320 Graph theory thus demonstrates the potential flaw in the idea
that the costs of unbundled access are confined to the network elements
that are directly involved. Instead, interconnection by competitors is likely
to introduce new sources and sinks into the network. Thus, substantial
317.
318.
319.
320.

See discussion supra pages 48-51.
See discussion supra page 112-13.
HUBER, KELLOGG & THORNE, supra note 2, §§ 5.4.7-8.
See Spulber & Yoo, Graph Theory Approach, supra note 9, at 1703-13.
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amounts of traffic may originate and terminate at points in the network that
differ from the host network’s initial points of origin and termination. This
will alter traffic patterns. A network that is designed with a maximum
flow/minimum cut pattern designed around particular sources and sinks
will no longer be appropriate for traffic coming from new sources and
sinks. The nodes at which interconnection occurs will not be the only nodes
affected. Rather, the effects will be distributed across all nodes and links
within the network. This invalidates the notion that only the incremental
costs of providing the interconnection should be recovered. The
interconnection affects the network’s performance and creates costs
throughout the network.
Moreover, graph theory shows that one should not expect the effects
of UNE access to be confined to those elements. When individual elements
are viewed in isolation, the TELRIC methodology seems quite reasonable.
Typically, UNE access occupies only a few of the elements of an
incumbent LEC’s network. Those elements, however, can be critical to
overall traffic patterns that connect the network’s sources and sinks. The
reduction of available capacity on critical links in the network will affect
the network’s maximum flow. Thus, UNE access can impose costs on the
host network that extend well beyond the elements that are affected. 321 In
some cases, the costs of UNE access may even exceed interconnection
costs. If usage patterns associated with interconnection are similar to those
of the incumbent LEC’s own traffic, absent any capacity constraints, there
will be less of an impact on the network owner’s decisions about network
configuration. There will be no change in the network elements that
comprise the minimum cut and, thus, in the components that constitute
bottlenecks. The situation is quite different when usage patterns associated
with interconnection differ from the patterns of the incumbent’s own
traffic. When that is the case, granting access to critical UNEs can create
bottlenecks where none previously existed and can have a dramatic impact
on the network’s maximum flow. Under these circumstances, UNE access
can have a dramatic impact on the cost, capacity, and configuration of
networks. 322
These problems are exacerbated by the fact that the 1996 Act
obligates the network owner to permit unbundled access “at any technically
feasible point.” 323 The introduction of traffic flows at disaggregated points
chosen by competitors deep in the heart of the network, where such traffic
would not otherwise occur, has a much greater potential to cause

321. Id.
322. Id.
323. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)(B) (2000).
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discontinuous and unpredictable disruptions to the network than other
forms of access.
In addition, unbundled access increases transaction costs to a greater
degree than other forms of access. For example, a network owner
attempting to manage its network will need a great deal of information
about the magnitude, timing, and variability of traffic associated with each
element to which unbundled access is sought. The fact that much of the
traffic will originate and be transmitted, at least in part, on other networks
places much of this information outside the network owner’s control.
Further, it forces network owners to develop systems for provisioning
and monitoring network usage at points that would not otherwise be
available to customers or other carriers. As Justice Breyer noted in
criticizing the 1996 Act’s UNE access requirements in Iowa Utilities
Board:
The more complex the facilities, the more central their relation
to the firm’s managerial responsibilities, the more extensive the
sharing demanded, the more likely these costs will become
serious. And the more serious they become, the more likely they
will offset any economic or competitive gain that a sharing
requirement might otherwise provide. 324
He further observed that unbundled access “can have significant
administrative and social costs inconsistent with the Act’s purposes.” 325 If
taken to an extreme, “[r]ules that force firms to share every resource or
element of a business would create not competition, but pervasive
regulation, for the regulators, not the marketplace, would set the relevant
terms.” 326
Most problematically, unbundled access delays the emergence of
facilities-based competition by deterring investment in alternative last-mile
facilities. Justice Breyer’s separate opinion in Iowa Utilities Board
described how unbundled access reduces incumbents’ incentives to invest
in their own networks when he pointed out that unbundled access:
may diminish the original owner’s incentive to keep up or to
improve the property by depriving the owner of the fruits of
value-creating investment, research, or labor . . . . [One cannot]
guarantee that firms will undertake the investment necessary to
produce complex technological innovations knowing that any
competitive advantage deriving from those innovations will be
dissipated by the sharing requirement. 327

324. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 428-29 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal citations omitted).
325. Id. at 428.
326. Id. at 429.
327. Id. at 428-29.

112

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61

In Verizon v. FCC, Justice Breyer reiterated the negative impact that
unbundled access on incumbents’ incentive “either to innovate or to invest
in a new ‘element.’” 328 Unbundled access envisions “that the incumbent
will share with competitors the cost-reducing benefits of a successful
innovation, while leaving the incumbent to bear the costs of most
unsuccessful investments on its own. Why would investment not then
stagnate?” 329
Unbundled access reduces the investment incentives of new entrants
as well as incumbents. TELRIC bases UNE access prices on the costs of a
hypothetical, most efficient network. Justice Breyer observed that this
pricing approach essentially guarantees that new entrants will find it more
cost effective to obtain unbundled access to elements of the existing
network than to build or buy those network elements elsewhere. 330
Furthermore, new entrants must take into account the fact that any future
technological improvements will cause UNE access rates to fall still
further. Thus, any firm considering building its own facilities faces the real
possibility that regulation will place it at a cost disadvantage, as TELRIC
ensures that other competitors will be able to take advantage of any cost
reductions that take place in the future without having to undertake the risk
of making any investments. This will not only harm new entrants who
invest in facilities, it will induce firms to compete by sharing the existing
network even though lower-cost alternatives exist. Although the FCC
claims that unbundled access “will sometimes ‘serve as a transitional
arrangement until fledgling competitors could develop a customer base and
complete the construction of their own networks,’” 331 Justice Breyer asks,
“[w]hy, given the pricing rules, would those ‘fledgling competitors’ ever
try to fly on their own?” 332
Lastly, Justice Breyer acknowledged that unbundled access leads to
an extremely thin form of competition:
That is because firms that share existing facilities do not
compete in respect to the facilities that they share, any more than
several grain producers who auction their grain at a single jointly
owned market compete in respect to auction services. Yet rules
that combine a strong monetary incentive to share with a broad
definition of “network element” will tend to produce widespread
sharing of entire incumbent systems under regulatory

328. Verizon Comm. Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 551 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
329. Id. (internal citations omitted).
330. Id.
331. Id. at 551 (quoting UNE Remand Order, supra note 69, at 3700 para. 6).
332. Id.
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supervision—a result very different from the competitive market
that the statute seeks to create. 333
A majority of the Supreme Court would ultimately endorse all aspects
of Justice Breyer’s reasoning in the Trinko decision. 334 As we noted earlier,
empirical studies have demonstrated the negative impact that unbundled
access has on investments in local telephone facilities.
It is for this reason that the unbundled access provisions of the 1996
Act contain some limiting principles. Specifically, it limits UNE access to
elements to which access is “necessary” and without which a new
competitor would be impaired in its ability to offer competing services. 335
These limitations recognize that little is to be gained and much to be lost by
compelling access to elements available on the open market for other
sources.
The FCC has faced nearly insuperable difficulties to construe these
limitations in a way that makes economic sense. As noted earlier, the FCC
needed four tries to develop rules that could withstand judicial scrutiny.
And by this time, the unbundling rules had largely become moot, as the
FCC had deregulated unbundling of network elements providing service to
large business customers and had deregulated key network elements needed
to provide local telephone service to small business and residential
customers.

F.

Regulatory Arbitrage

Organizing the different types of access into distinct categories
inevitably poses significant definitional challenges, particularly in an
industry undergoing dynamic technological change. The differences in
compensation regimes allow providers to engage in regulatory arbitrage by
altering access rates simply by changing the way that service is
characterized or by making relatively small technological changes.
Consider, for example, the proper categorization of the first
generation of Internet service providers—such as the original services
offered by CompuServe, Prodigy, and America Online—which established
local offices housing modem banks through which consumers could
connect to the Internet through their dial-up modems. It is possible to
conceptualize the access provided to these companies in any one of four
ways. First, these companies could simply be regarded as end-users simply
purchasing business lines from the local telephone company, in which case
333. Id. at 550-51 (internal citations omitted).
334. Verizon Comm., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). For
a more detailed analysis of Trinko and its implications for telecommunications, see Spulber
& Yoo, Mandating Access, supra note 193, at 1864-67.
335. 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(2)(A)-(B) (2000).
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they would be provided service through retail access. 336 Second, these
companies could also be characterized as providing complementary
services, in which case they would receive service via platform access.
Third, these companies could declare themselves to be a specialized local
telephone company serving a single customer and seek service through
interconnection access. Fourth, these companies could use unbundled
access to purchase all of the elements they needed to provide service to
their end customers.
These difficulties would be of little concern if a single, consistent
pricing regime applied to all of these different types of access.
Unfortunately, different types of access are governed by different
ratemaking approaches and are often imposed by different regulatory
entities. Retail access is regulated by state PUCs employing either cost-ofservice ratemaking or price caps. Retail rates often include a wide variety
of specialized waivers and reflect a wide range of internal cross-subsidies,
through state-wide rate averaging and through differential pricing of
business and residential services. The fact that prices are not always set in a
way that reflects cost within a single jurisdiction raises the possibility of
arbitrage even within retail access.
Wholesale access rates are often said to be constructed from the top
down, in that they are typically based on retail rates less any avoided costs,
such as marketing, billing, and collection. The fact that these rates are
based on rates incorporating implicit cross-subsidies again leaves
wholesale access vulnerable to regulatory arbitrage. Further inefficiency
may result from difficulties in determining precisely which retailing costs
are avoided when another provider invokes wholesale access.
Platform access rates often said to be built from the bottom up, in that
they are based on the cost of providing particular services. Platform access
rates vary widely depending on the nature of the complementary service
being provided. Long-distance providers pay access charges that have
historically exceeded actual cost, in order to allow long-distance service to
cross-subsidize local service. 337 Information service providers, in contrast,
have long been exempt from access charges. 338 Although the FCC is in the

336. Access Charge Reform, First Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 15982, 16132 para.
342 (1997); MTS and WATS Market Structure, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 97
F.C.C.2d 682, 715 para. 83 (1983).
337. See HUBER, KELLOGG, & THORNE, supra note 2, § 6.2.1.2-.3 (recounting the history
of the long distance-local cross subsidy embedded in the post-MFJ access charges).
338. See Access Charge Reform Order, supra note 286, at 16131-35 paras. 341-348
(describing the history of the so-called “ESP exemption” and deciding to retain it).
Subsequent orders indicated that the FCC may be willing to reconsider its position some
time in the future. See Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress,
13 F.C.C.R. 11501, 11534-36 paras. 69-72, 11571 para. 147 (1998) [hereinafter Stevens
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process of reforming the access charge regime, the agency has consistently
stopped short of embracing full-fledged, cost-based, subsidy-free rates 339
Platform access rates are further distorted by the fact that long-distance
providers are required to pay into the universal service fund, whereas
information service providers are not. 340
Unbundled access rates are required to be calculated in a different
manner. The statute requires that UNE access rates be “based on the cost
(determined without reference to a rate-of-return or other rate-based
proceeding) of providing the interconnection or network element.” 341
The FCC implemented this requirement through TELRIC, which is
based on the forward-looking incremental costs of a hypothetical network
providing service through the most efficient technology at the locations of
the existing wire centers. Like platform access rates, unbundled access
rates are built from the bottom up. However, the absence of implicit
subsidies and the rejection of a methodology based on historical cost in
favor of one based on the replacement cost of a network employing the
most efficient current technology leads to widely disparate results.
Finally, interconnection access is governed by the reciprocal
compensation provisions of the 1996 Act, which mandates that rates
provide for “the mutual and reciprocal recovery by each carrier of costs
associated with the transport and termination on each carrier's network
facilities of calls that originate on the network facilities of the other
carrier.” 342 The statute specifically does not “preclude arrangements that
afford the mutual recovery of costs through the offsetting of reciprocal
obligations, including arrangements that waive mutual recovery (such as
bill-and-keep arrangements).” 343
As noted above, the FCC has implemented interconnection access
through TELRIC, although it is considering replacing TELRIC with bill
and keep. 344
The result is that different methodologies apply to rates established
for each different type of access. The inconsistency raises the possibility
Report]; Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime, Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 4685, 4707 para. 45, app. C at 4787 n.48 (2005).
339. See MTS and WATS Market Structure, Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.R. 2953, 295455 para. 13, 2957 para. 27 (1987); Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report
and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 8776, 8785 para. 13, 8786-87 para. 17 (1997) [hereinafter Universal
Service Order]; Access Charge Reform Order, supra note 286, at 16002 paras. 45-46,
16010-11 para. 73.
340. See Universal Service Order, supra note 339, at 9179-80 paras. 788-789; Stevens
Report, supra note 338, at 11549 paras. 99.
341. 47 U.S.C. § 252 (d)(1)(A)(i).
342. Id. § 252(d)(2)(A)(i).
343. Id. § 252(d)(2)(B)(i).
344. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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that firms will attempt to manipulate the categories of access in order to
engage in regulatory arbitrage. The most prominent example of this is the
controversy over UNE-P. A carrier that wished to compete by reselling the
facilities of an incumbent local telephone company has two choices. The
most straightforward way is to invoke the resale provisions of the 1996 Act
and purchase wholesale access to the entire network at wholesale prices.
Regulators set wholesale access rates at fifteen percent to twenty-five
percent below full retail. 345 At the same time, wholesale access can be
duplicated simply by using unbundled access to purchase all of the
elements necessary to provide local service. In contrast to the top-down
approach to wholesale access prices, in which wholesale access prices are
based on deductions from full retail prices, UNE access prices are
calculated from the bottom up based on the long-run incremental cost of
particular network elements. Until the deregulation of mass market
switching effectively abolished UNE-P in 2005, new entrants were able to
leverage the differences in the pricing to obtain wholesale access at rates
substantially below what those regulators deemed appropriate. 346
The opportunity for regulatory arbitrage will remain so long as access
mandates remain in place and differences in the methodologies for
calculating access rates persist. Eventually, the advent of competition will
obviate the need to harmonize these pricing regimes by eliminating the
need for imposing access requirements in the first place.

V. CONCLUSION
The telecommunications industry has undergone a fundamental
transformation in the years following the breakup of AT&T. Technological
progress has continued to open more areas of the industry to competition.
Perhaps most strikingly, breakthrough developments in network technology
has made it possible for competition to emerge, not only in complementary
telecommunications services, such as long distance, CPE, and information
services, but also in the basic transportation services provided by local
telephone networks. Indeed, the digitization of electronic communications
may cause the distinction between basic and complementary services to
collapse altogether.
This technological revolution has been accompanied by a conceptual
revolution that has been equally transformative. Breakthroughs in the
economics of industrial organization have altered our notions of market
failure and provided new insights into how private ordering can solve many
problems once believed to require regulatory intervention. Particularly
when combined with the growing appreciation of the limits of the tools
345. Hazlett, supra note 180, at 484.
346. Id. at 483-87.
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used to implement regulation, these technological and conceptual advances
have opened up the policy space in new and exciting ways.
The problem is that our nation’s telecommunications policy has
struggled to keep up with these changes. Our regulatory regime continues
to invoke regulatory justifications and to adhere to cost-based approaches
whose relevance shrinks with every passing year. Moreover, many aspects
of the current regime are largely the result of the industry’s regulatory
history. The result is a confused jumble of contradictory policies that are
vulnerable to regulatory arbitrage.
Most problematic is that current policymaking has failed to capture
what is perhaps networks’ most distinctive feature, which is their ability to
compensate for disruptions to the network by rerouting traffic along
different paths. In short, current policy conceives of networks as
aggregations of individual components without taking into account the way
that interactions among particular network components can cause them to
respond in sharply discontinuous and unpredictable ways.
This Article attempts to address these shortcomings by offering a
critical reassessment of the rationales traditionally invoked to justify the
regulation of local telephone networks. It also lays out an integrated
framework for modeling network behavior that captures the importance of
network configuration and the interactions among individual network
components. It applies a five-part framework for categorizing different
types of access to assess how each type of access has a different impact on
network cost, configuration, capacity, and reliability. Lastly, it draws on
Coase’s theory of the firm to show how mandating access alters networks’
natural boundaries and increases their transaction costs by forcing them to
externalize functions that would more economically be handled inside the
boundary of the firm.
What results is an approach of considerable analytical power. We
recognize that we have barely scratched the surface of the insights that
graph theory can provide into telecommunications policy. We hope that
future work will explore further implications of our approach. That said,
even without any further extensions or refinements, the importance of
modeling networks as complex systems should be apparent.
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